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APRIL L. CHERRY*

Social Contract Theory, Welfare
Reform, Race, and the Male Sex
Right

I

n his 1994 State of the Union Address, President Clinton
promised to end "welfare as we know it." 1 Many believe that

* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University, College of Law. A.B., Vas
sar College, 1986; J.D., Yale Law School, 1990. Research for this article was com
pleted with a grant from the Florida State University College of Law. I would like
to thank current and former students Clintina Brown, Rhonda Henderson, Tim
Schardl, and Melanie Stewart and law librarians Susan Martin and Patricia Simonds
for their research assistance; I also want to thank Professors Mary Lyndon Shanley
and Miriam Cohen for their continued support. Moreover, I would like to express
my gratitude to Andre Taylor and Joyce, Aaron, Laura, and Pamela Cherry, who
loved and cared for my babies and who found the time and space in their busy lives
to give me the time and the space I needed to write. And last but not least, I would
like to thank my friends and colleagues Professors Meg Baldwin and Beth Gammie
for their helpful research suggestions, for their comments on earlier drafts, and for
teaching me about the justice of billiards.
1 William J. Clinton, The State of the Union Address, WASH. PosT, Jan. 26, 1994, at
A12. In fact, President Clinton said:
[The current welfare system] doesn't work; it defies our values as a nation.
If we value work, we can't justify a system that makes welfare more attrac
tive than work ....
. . . The people who most want to change this system are the people who
are dependent on it. They want to get off welfare; they want to go back to
work ....
But to all those who depend on welfare, we should offer ultimately a
simple compact. We will provide the support, the job training, the child
care you need for up to two years, but after that anyone who can work,
must ....
Id.

In 1994 both Democrats and Republicans offered their visions for welfare reform.
The president's proposal was introduced as the Work and Responsibility Act of
1994, H.R. 4605, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (hereinafter WRA]. The Republicans
soon offered the Personal Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) [hereinafter PRA], and the Family Reinforcement Act, H.R. 11, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995). These proposals sought to work a profound reform in the Aid to
Families with Dependant Children program (AFDC), which was the primary federal
[1037]
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he fulfilled this promise during his 1996 reelection campaign by
signing into law a substantially Republican welfare reform bill
that radically transforms the way in which government will ad
dress the needs of poor women and children. 2 It is clear that this
transformation will come at the expense of poor women and
poor children. 3 This new law, the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), pro
hibits single women4 from collecting certain welfare benefits for
more than sixty months, whether or not consecutive, with the ex
pectation that after five years these women will have skills to
enter the paid job market and earn wages sufficient to support
their families. 5 The statute fulfills President Clinton's vision that
need-based program for poor, dependent children and their custodial parents or
caretaker family members. This program provided these families with "subsistence"
income maintenance. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1994).
2 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) [hereinafter PRWORA). This statute disman
tles the previous federal public assistance program for poor families with children,
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, and establishes the
"Temporary Assistance to Needy Families" program (TANF) as the primary source
of federal assistance for needy families.
3 A common estimate is that "more than a million children" will be impoverished
under the new proposals. Dorothy Gilliam, Turning Their Backs on the Poor,
WASH. PosT, Aug. 3, 1996, at Bl. The proposals include cuts to food stamp pro
grams and aid to legal immigrants. See Barbara Vobejda, Clinton Signs Welfare Bill
Amid Division, WASH. PosT, Aug. 23, 1996, at Al. It has been estimated that as
many as 2.6 million people, including 1.1 million additional children, will be pushed
into poverty by the new law and that the "poverty of millions who are already poor
will be deepened." CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHIL
DREN: YEARBOOK 1997 at 1 {1997); After 60 Years Most Control ls Passing to the
States, CONG. Q., Weekly Report, Aug. 3, 1996, at 2190, 2196 [hereinafter After 60
Years].
A number of states have already sought and received waivers from federal statu
tory guidelines under the AFDC program, allowing those states to implement
projects which penalize poor women who are unable or unwilling to enter the paid
labor market. Such waivers are authorized under section 1315 of the Social Security
Act, granting the Department of Health and Human Services the power to waive the
federal standards if the proposed state program will assist in promoting the objec
tives of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 {1948). Susan Bennett and Kathleen Sullivan
report that since 1992 at least 30 states have sought waivers for state "demonstration
projects" and argue that the deviations from federal norms permitted under the
waiver process often represent defaults against the core values of the AFDC statute.
Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare
"Reform," 26 MICH. J. L. REFORM 741, 742 (1993); see also Lucy A. Williams, The
Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE
L.J. 719 (1992) {discussing various demonstration projects).
4 Although the language speaks to "single parents," the vast majority of "parents"
affected will be women.
5 PRWORA, supra note 2, § 103(a){l), 110 Stat. 2113 (purpose of statute is to end
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welfare recipients should enter into an agreement with the state
and pledge that they will participate in programs designed to
help them move from welfare to "self-sufficiency" in exchange
for job training and child care benefits. 6 As the President stated
in his 1994 State of the Union Address: "[T]o all those who de
pend on welfare, we should offer ultimately a simple compact.
We will provide the support, the job training, the child care you
need for up to two years, but after that anyone who can work,
must ...." 7 The material terms of Clinton's new social contract
are threefold: (1) they are unilateral; (2) they are race-selective;
and (3) they have as their purpose sexual punishment.
In reality, only poor women are bound by the terms of this
"new" social contract. Poor women will be denied benefits after
two to five years even if the state does not appropriate sufficient
funds necessary for job training, education, and child care. 8
States are not required to increase funds to programs that dis
tribute birth control devices or provide information regarding
birth control or sex education, nor is there federal funding of
abortion services. 9 As Professor Gwendolyn Mink has noted:
"Ending welfare as we know it," means forcing women to
choose work outside the home or marriage after two years on
dependency by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage). In fact, the Insti
tute for Women's Policy Research reports that about 50% of women on AFDC work
outside of their homes either concurrently, while receiving benefits because the ben
efits are not sufficient, or during frequent stints in the work force interspersed by
short periods on AFDC. Williams, supra note 3, at 746 n.177 (citing ROBERTA
SPALTER-ROTH ET AL., COMBINING WORK AND WELFARE: AN ALTERNATIVE
ANTI-POVERTY STRATEGY (Report to the Ford Foundation for the Institute for Wo
men's Policy Research, 1993)).
6 See Note, Dethroning the Welfare Queen: The Rhetoric of Reform, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 2013, 2027 (1994).
7 Clinton, supra note 1, at A12.
s PRWORA, supra note 2, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2113 (no legal entitlement to
assistance); id., 110 Stat. 2137 (no assistance for more than five years).
9 Although the PRWORA does not contain a child exclusion provision, the De
partment of Health and Human Services has allowed states to deny benefits to chil
dren who are conceived and born while their mothers are receiving welfare benefits.
See supra note 3. While the PRWORA does allow states to use federal block grant
money for "prepregnancy" family services-that is, contraceptive services-it does
not require that states do so, and it does not provide additional money to states that
provide such services. PRWORA, supra note 2, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2134. Finally,
because of severe limitations on federal funding for abortion services, poor women
have been forced to continue unplanned pregnancies or to have abortions per
formed by unlicensed practitioners. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27
(1980) (Hyde Amendment, which restricts federal funding for most abortions for
women, upheld as constitutional); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
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AFDC. It means forcing poor mothers to sink or swim in an
economy that could not provide jobs for the nine million so
cially insured workers who collected unemployment compen
sation between 1990 and 1993. It means forcing women into
sometimes unwanted and dangerous relations with the fathers
of their children through child support enforcement. It means
forcing the poorest of single mothers-women of color-into
low wage community jobs because high rates of unemploy
ment among men of color erase the economic benefits prom
ised by child support enforcement and marriage. It means
forcing the poorest of single mothers to control their fertility;
it means limiting their reproductive choices. 10

On its face, the PRWORA is racially neutral; in fact, though,
Black 11 women are particularly targeted by the new welfare stat
ute. Underlying the welfare reform movement generally, and the
statute in particular, is the image of the typical welfare recipient
as a promiscuous African American teenage girl with little or no
self-control or respect for the values of the white middle class. 12
As the Children's Defense Fund Director, Marian Wright
10 Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in Historical Perspective, 26 CoNN. L. REv.
879, 881-82 (1994).
11 In this Article, I use the terms "African American" and "Black" interchangea
bly. I find the linguistic shift a bit troubling. I came of age when the descendants of
American slaves were called, and called themselves, Black. I remember when Black
was beautiful. Also, I find the term "African American" a bit limiting. For example,
the term "Black" encompasses folks like Black Puerto Ricans, Afro-Cuban Ameri
cans, and other Afro-Caribbean Americans. I believe that the term "African Amer
ican" refers only to persons of African descent whose ancestors were taken to the
North American continent. It does not include those Americans whose ancestors
were taken to other places in the African diaspora. We Black folk might want to
think about whether we want to define our community so narrowly. In any event,
I'm not sure it's worth the argument. As a community, Black people have a plethora
of problems to address; we need not fight over this-at least not now. So I am
adjusting to the new term and the new self-definition that goes with it. I have come
to believe that the term "African American" better reflects my own cultural identity
and the cultural identity of most of the descendants in the United States of those
who survived the genocide of the Middle Passage.
I also capitalize the word "Black" when it refers to a person's race in order to
reflect the political meaning of Blackness-that is, the political and social signifance
of being black in this society. Cf. Victor F. Caldwell, Book Review, 96 CoLUM. L.
REV. 1363, 1369-70 (1996) (critical race theory view of race acknowledges past and
continuing racial subordination and oppression; by contrast, a more formal view of
race treats race as merely reflecting skin color or ancestral origins).
12 RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE
BEFORE Roe v. Wade (1992) (detailing the history of the stigmatization of young
African American mothers); see also Williams, supra note 3, at 725 (assembling the
rhetorics of welfare reform in the 1980s, targeting women who fail to conform to
middle-class behavioral and value norms); KEN AULETIA, THE UNDERCLASS 210-19
(1982) (the poor are unable to obtain employment because of their unwillingness to
model their behavior according to acceptable cultural norms).
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Edelman, has asserted, "welfare" is a "'fourth generation code
word' for race." 13 The image of welfare has been attached to
Black women even though, as of 1991, African American fami
lies made up less than thirty-nine percent of the welfare
population. 14
Also underlying the attack on "welfare as we know it" is the
rhetoric that poor women of color on welfare are undeserving of
assistance because they have broken the social contract by engag
ing in (heterosexual) sexual intercourse outside of the bonds of
marriage and because they have had, and are believed to con
tinue to have, children outside of the institution of marriage. 15 In
this country, single and teenage motherhood are thought of in
blackface. 16 As the conservative welfare scholar Charles Murray
stated, "[B)lack illegitimacy ... has always been at the center of
public concern about illegitimacy and at the center of debate
about causes." 17
In fact, in 1991 teenage mothers comprised only 5% of the total recipients of
AFDC. More than 80% of these mothers were either 18 or 19 years old. U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS OF FINANCIAL CIRCUM
STANCES OF AFDC RECIPIENTS: FY 1991 at 43 {1993).
13 Lucie White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency" from a Different
Ground, 81 GEo. L.J. 1961, 1966 {1993) (quoting Marian Wright Edelman in Robin
Toner, New Politics of Welfare Focuses on Its Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1992, at Al,
A6).
14 STAFF OF HousE COMM. oN WAYS AND MEANS, 103D CoNG., lsT SEss., OvER
v1Ew OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS 1993 GREEN BOOK 708-09 table 36 (Comm.
Print 1993) [hereinafter 1993 GREEN BooK].
15 Over 75% of families receiving AFDC benefits have only one or two children.
Id. At least one study comparing the fertility rates of women receiving AFDC with
the fertility rates of women who receive no AFDC benefits has concluded that wo
men receiving AFDC benefits have a lower fertility rate than does the general popu
lation. Mark R. Rank, Fertility Among Women on Welfare: Incidence and
Determinants, 54 AM. Soc. REv. 296, 298-300 {1989).
16 Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1
AM. U. J. OF GENDER & LAW 1, 25 {1993) {"Ideologically, in America, single moth
erhood is Black."); see also Wahneema Lubiano, Black Ladies, Welfare Queens, and
State Minstrels: Ideological War by Narrative Means, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN
GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CON
STRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 323, 332-33 (Toni Morrison ed. 1992) {discussing the
image of the Black "welfare queen").
17 Charles Murray, Does Welfare Bring More Babies, PUBLIC INTEREST, Mar. 1994
(1994 WL 13505737).
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan widely publicized this attitude in his 1965 re
port, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. This report assigned to Afri
can American women the blame for Black people's inability to overcome the effects
of four hundred years of racial hatred and discrimination in this country. He stated
that "the Negro community has been forced into a matriarchal structure which, be
cause it is too out of line with the rest of the American society, seriously retards the
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As a result of this view of welfare, the PRWORA mandates
that women either get a job or get a man-specifically, one who
is able to support financially the woman and her children. As
Professor Martha Fineman has noted:
[T]he core and common problem facing [poor, single] mothers
... is identified as the missing male. It follows, therefore, that
the solution to the problem for both categories of single
mothers lies in the legally-coerced (re )establishment of a pa
ternal presence, physically outside of, but metaphysically com
pleting, the family structure. 18

For those women who are unwilling to remain celibate as the mo
rality of the state directs, the federal government permits states
to penalize sexually active poor women for having additional
children while on welfare.
Indeed, it has become popular and acceptable to expect poor
women of color and their children to shoulder the costs of bal
ancing the national budget and the blame for what is viewed as
America's unraveling moral fabric. 19 An evaluation of an earlier
Senate version of the welfare reform bill, performed by the De
partment of Health and Human Services, found that the two-year
time limit provision alone would result in denying assistance to
3.3 million children living in poverty. 20 African American chil
progress of the group as a whole." OFFICE OF POLICY & PLANNING RESEARCH, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 29
(1965).
Bill Moyers, a journalist and former advisor to President Johnson, may have been
more influential in popularizing the image of Black mothers as socially deviant in his
1986 CBS Special Report, The Vanishing Black Family-Crisis in Black America
(CBS News 1986). As Professor Jewell Greshom has noted: "The East Texan, in
sympathetic 'liberal' guise, took cameras into a Newark, New Jersey, housing project
for an 'intimate' portrait of black teen-age welfare mothers, sexually irresponsible if
not criminal youth, a smiling black male 'superstud,' and pervasive pathology all
around." Jewell Handy Greshom, The Politics of Family in America, NATION July
24/31, 1989, at 118.
18 Martha Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L.J. 274,
276.
19 See, e.g.' CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY,
1950-1980 (1984). Murray's thesis is that welfare mothers cause male unemploy
ment. Single mothers encourage male irresponsibility, which in turn undermines
their work ethic and social productivity.
20 Office of the Ass't Sec'y for Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Services, Comparison of House and Senate Welfare Reform Plans Passed by
the House March 24, 1995 and Senate September 19, 1995-"lmpact on Children" 1
(November 1995) (internal report; on file with author). The report states that, ab
sent a recession, 3.3 million children would be affected if the time limit provision was
fully implemented.
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dren certainly will be overrepresented in this group. 21 By deny
ing economic assistance to poor children whose mothers do not
comply with the social contract's rules of sexual subordination to
an individual man, particularly through marriage,22 or sexual sub
ordination to the state, through state-enforced celibacy, the state,
through the PRWORA, is attacking the sexual independence and
reproductive choices of poor women and women of color in the
name of welfare reform and in the name of a modem social
contract.
In this Article I hope to demonstrate fully that the PRWORA
is ultimately a politically undesirable and thinly veiled attack on
the reproductive and sexual activities of poor women; to demon
strate the difficulties of social contract theory as a rationalization
for this attack; and to argue that welfare reform proposals are
based in the state's claim of right to command the use of wo
men's bodies. In Part I, I examine the development of social
contract theory and analyze social contract theory as a justifica
tion for material inequality. In Part II, I examine social contract
theory as a justification for the subordination of women. With
this theoretical background established, in Part III, I evaluate the
current welfare reform proposals as social contract. This section
examines the social contractarian language found in the current
welfare reform debates and argues that this "new" social contract
reinforces the male sex-right and the subordination of women.
In doing so, the new social contract replaces the male sex-right of
husbands to control the sexuality of their wives in exchange for
21 Cf. PRA, supra note 1, § 100(3)(A)-(B) (illegitimacy rate among African
Americans is 68%, compared to 22% for white Americans); PRWORA, supra note
2, § 101(5), 110 Stat. 2110 (89% of children living in female-headed households re
ceive AFDC).
22 The institution of marriage has long been founded on women's sexual and eco
nomic subordination. Regarding marriage and the sexual subordination of women,
see generally Carol Smart, Disruptive Bodies and Unruly Sex: The Regulation of
Reproduction and Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century, in REGULATING WOMAN
HOOD: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON MARRIAGE, MOTHERHOOD AND SEXUALITY 7, 20
22, 25 (Carol Smart ed. 1992) (marriage is a systemic mode of regulating women's
sexuality); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 2-5, 50-55 (1988) (same).
Regarding marriage and the economic subordination of women, see generally
MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA
(1986) (detailing the ways in which married women's property, both real and per
sonal, was legally controlled by their husbands); Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds
and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age of Emancipation, 75 J. AM. HlsT.
471, 471-74, 480-84 (1988) (under common law, married women had no right to con
tract; their labor belonged to their husbands); Richard H. Chused, Married Women's
Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEo. L.J. 1359 (1983) (same).
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subsistence with the sex-right of the state to control the sexuality
of poor, single women in exchange for subsistence.
I
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
MATERIAL INEQUALITY

In this part, I outline the basics of both classical and contempo

rary social contract theory, drawing on the works of Thomas
Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau as exemplars of
classic social contract theory and on John Rawls's work as an ex
emplar of contemporary social contract theory. Next I discuss
the social contract as justification for material inequality and as
justification for distributive justice.
A.

Classical Social Contract Theory

In the beginning was the state of nature. Nature was a perilous
place, a place from which civilized, rational, reasonable men
sought to escape. These men found their escape in the creation
of civil society. Classical social contractarians agree that the
State, or civil society, is the result of an agreement or contract
made among individuals (men) who sought protection from the
perils of the state of nature (life before civil society). For some
social contract theorists, the state of nature and the creation of
the social contract are historical events. 23 For others, these no
tions are political fictions used to explain either the legitimate
existence of the State24 or the legitimate parameters of its
23 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 276, 333-35 (Peter Laslett ed.,
student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698).
24 Regarding Thomas Hobbes, see, e.g., C.B. MacPherson, Introduction to
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 40 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1981)
(1651); Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Con
tract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IowA L. REv. 769, 849 n.363 (1985). Re
garding Rousseau, see JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 49
(Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Classics 1968) (1762) [hereinafter RoussEAU, So
CIAL CONTRACT] ("My purpose is to consider if, in political society, there can be any
legitimate and sure principle of government, taking men as they are and laws as they
might be."); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in JEAN
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT; DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF
INEQUALITY; DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 105, 116 (Donald A. Cress trans.
& ed., Hackett Publishing 1983) (1754) [hereinafter Rousseau, Inequality) (examin
ing "the hypothetical history of governments"). Regarding the concept of political
fiction, see EDMUND s. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988).
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authority. 25
Notwithstanding disagreements over these theories, social con
tractarians agree that a just society is created when people relin
quish their "natural" autonomy or liberty and consent to live
under a rule of law. In such an exchange, one gives up the life of
all against all in order to benefit from the security, order, and
freedom that result from the rule of law. 26 For the agreement to
be valid, there must be freedom of choice. Men must be free to
choose civil society over the state of nature. But as Ian MacNeil
notes, the validity of contract "does not require that choice be
real, only that we act as if it is."27
1.

Hobbes: The State of Nature Is War

For Thomas Hobbes, men are equal in the state of nature.
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and
mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes
manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another;
yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man,
and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can there
upon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not
pretend, as well as he. 28

Hobbes does not celebrate this equality; he fears it. According
to Hobbes, the result of equality in the state of nature is war,
because "[f]rom this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope
in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men de
sire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy,
they become enemies; and in the way to their End ... endeavour
to destroy, or subdue one an other." 29 Because of the violence of
the state of nature, a man cannot use his mind or body in any
way other than to "preserv[e] his life against his enemyes." 30 The
result of such war is not merely the death of men, but the death
of humanity. Thus, in the state of nature, "there is no place for
Industry ... no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account
of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all,
continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of
25 LoCKE, supra note 23.
26 HOBBES, supra note 24,

at 234.

27 IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACI"UAL RELATIONS 3 (1980).
28 HOBBES, supra note 24, at 183.

29
30

Id. at 184.
Id. at 190.
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man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." 31 Under these
conditions there can be no concept of justice or injustice:
The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have
there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no
Law: where no Law, no Injustice.... Justice, and Injustice are
none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind.... Th~
are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude.
As one commentator on Hobbes opined, "[O]nly in civil society
is there mutual recognition of the obligation of obedience and
the certainty of enforcement by the sovereign." 33
The social contract offers Hobbes a way out of the ominous
morass of the state of nature. Hobbes reasons that civil society
can be created only by unequivocal obedience to a sovereign
founded on a social contract, in which all individuals agree to
transfer or relinquish their natural freedom to the sovereign in
the interest of maintaining peace. Hobbes writes: "The only way
to erect such a Common Power [civil society] ... is, to conferre
all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assem
bly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices,
unto one Will." 34 Hobbes believes that only a sovereign with ab
solute power can bring man out of the state of nature. 35 The only
limit on the sovereign's power is that the sovereign may not pro
hibit individuals from defending their lives, even against the sov
ereign. 36 Hobbes's social contract is a "mutuall transferring of
Right" 37 in which both the individual and the State acquire duties
and obligations. This social contract provides a mechanism not
only for the end of the chaos and violence of the state of nature
Id. at 186.
Id. at 188.
33 PAULE. SIGMUND, NATURAL LAW IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 78 (1971).
34 HOBBES, supra note 24, at 227.
35 Id. at 228, 260. Although Hobbes speaks of monarchs and assemblies, he be
lieves that absolute monarchy provides men with the best protection from anarchy,
war-the state of nature. See, e.g. , id. at 239-50.
36 Id. at 199 ("A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes
voyd. For ... no man can transferre, or lay down his Right to save himselfe from
Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment .... And this is granted to be true by all men, in
that they lead Criminals to Execution, and Prison, with armed men, notwithstanding
that such Criminals have consented to the Law, by which they are condemned."); see
also id. at 268-69 ("If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to
kill, wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain
from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot
live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.").
37 Id. at 192.
31

32
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but also for the enforcement of private agreements. 38
One of the primary functions of the social contract is to "legiti
mate and support inequality in the possession of wealth. " 39 Hob
bes assumed that inequality in the distribution of wealth will exist
in civil society. In his discussion of a citizen's duty to pay taxes,
Hobbes asserts that both the rich and the poor should pay the
same amount of tax since both receive protection from the sover
eign, regardless of their wealth. 40 Hobbes also supports the ine
quality of wealth in his discussion of public charity, where he
assumes that poverty is inevitable. Hobbes states: "[W]hereas
many men, by accident uninevitable, become unable to maintain
themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the Char
ity of private persons; but to be provided for (as far-forth as the
necessities of Nature require,) by the Lawes of the Common
wealth."41
Similarly, Hobbes also supports differential treatment of the
poor based on whether they merit assistance. Hobbes believes
that public charity should not be available to those able to work:
"[F]or such as have strong bodies ... they are to be forced to
work ...." 42 This legitimation of differential state obligations to
the "deserving" and "undeserving" poor continues in our current
discussion of economic assistance programs. 43
2.

Rousseau: Men Are Free and Equal in the State of Nature

Like Hobbes, Rousseau is concerned with man's exit from the
state of nature. In Rousseau's theory, the original state of nature
is quite peaceful, and men are free and equal. 44 Although the
men in Rousseau's state of nature are solitary and not capable of
supra note 24, at 858. Hobbes writes:
Therefore before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there must
be some coercive Power, to compell men equally to the performance of
their Covenants, by the terrour of some punishment, greater than the bene
fit they expect by the breach of their Covenant ... and such power there is
none before the erection of a Common-wealth.
HOBBES, supra note 24, at 202.
39 Rosenfeld, supra note 24, at 872.
40 HOBBES, supra note 24, at 386-87.
41 /d. at 387.
42/d.
43 For a historical account of welfare relief theories, see generally ROBERT E.
GOODIN, REASONS FOR WELFARE: THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE WELFARE
STATE (1988).
44 ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 24, at 49-58.
38 Rosenfeld,
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morality,45 they are guided not only by self-interest or self-love,
as are the men in Hobbes state of nature, but also by the emotion
of pity. 46 Because of the peacefulness of Rousseau's original
state of nature, "savage" man does not require the safety and
stability of civil society; consequently, he has no reason to enter
into a social contract. Rousseau writes: "[W]andering in the for
ests, without industry, without speech, without dwelling, without
war, without relationships, with no need for his fellow men, and
correspondingly with no desire to do them harm, ... savage man
... had only the sentiments and enlightenment appropriate to
that state; he felt only his true needs ...."47
Nevertheless, Rousseau envisions a process by which savage
man's social development necessitates that he acquiesce in the
creation of civil society. Rousseau continues:
Things in this state [of nature] could have remained equal, if
talents had been equal .... [But] [t]he strongest did the most
work; the most adroit turned theirs to better advantage: the
most ingenious found ways to shorten their labor .... Thus it is
that natural inequality [in ability] imperceptibly manifests it
self together with inequality occasioned by the socialization
process.48

War results only when men are forced into social relationships,
including the patriarchal family, and develop private property. 49
The prosperous begin to notice that war is disadvantageous to
both physical safety and wealth and that wealth based on force
could in tum be appropriated by force.
Influenced by this concern, those with material resources seek
to leave the state of nature and progress to a civil society which
45 Rousseau, Inequality, supra note 24, at 124 (solitary, idle), 125, 132; RoussEAU,
Soc1AL CONTRACT, supra note 24, at 64 (no "moral quality," only "instinct," in state
of nature).
46 Rousseau, Inequality, supra note 24, at 115, 133, 135. Rousseau writes:
[T]here is another principle that Hobbes failed to notice, and which, having
been given to man in order to mitigate, in certain circumstances, the feroc
ity of his egocentrism or the desire for self-preservation before this egocen
trism of his came into being, tempers the ardor he has for his own well
being by an innate repugnance to seeing fellow man suffer. ... I am refer
ring to pity ....
Id. at 133.
47 Id. at 137.
48 Id. at 147.
49 Jd. at 144 (social relationships and violence); id. at 144, 146 (private property
and violence, development of cultivation and agriculture tied to the rise in private
property); id. at 142-43 (creation of patriarchal family and distinctions among family
create tension).
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preserves the inequality found in this stage of the state of na
ture. 50 It is at this stage, Rousseau believes, that the State first
develops. Rousseau posits that at this stage the rich say: "'[L]et
us unite . . . in order to protect the weak from oppression, re
strain the ambitious, and assure everyone of possessing what be
longs to him. Let us institute rules of justice and peace to which
all will be obliged to conform, which will make special exceptions
for no one' ...." 51
But the poor have little reason to agree to a state which pre
serves their economic and social position. As Rousseau notes:
"Since the poor had nothing to lose but their liberty, it would
have been utter folly for them to have voluntarily surrendered
the only good remaining to them, gaining nothing in retum." 52
But the poor do "agree" to the formation of the state for that
very reason: because they have no "might" in the final stages of
the state of nature, they "agree" to the creation of a state whose
purpose is to perpetuate their inequality in order to protect their
freedom from those who have more wealth and physical power
than they do. 53 Hence, because force is used to obtain the poor's
acquiescence, force is the foundation of the first attempt at civil
society: might makes right. However, Rousseau believes that for
civil society to be just, it cannot be based on might: it must be
founded on the mutual agreement of all men in the state of na
ture, an agreement based on the will of each man. "To yield to
force is an act of necessity, not of will; it is at best an act of
prudence. " 54
So for Rousseau, the justification of the state at this point in
his hypothetical history is the legitimation of the exploitation of
the poor and the legitimation of the inequality of material goods
and other forms of economic resources. Rousseau concludes that
Id. at 149.
Id.; see also Rosenfeld, supra note 24, at 859.
52 Rousseau, Inequality, supra note 24, at 151.
53 Id.
54 ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 24, at 52. In addition, because free
dom is a natural right of man that is inalienable, slavery cannot exist in a just society.
It is incompatible with man's natural liberty. Rousseau explains:
To renounce freedom is to renounce one's humanity, one's rights as a
man and equally one's duties. There is no possible quid pro quo for one
who renounces everything; indeed such renunciation is contrary to man's
very nature; for if you take away all freedom of the will, you strip a man's
actions of all moral significance.
Id. at 55.
50
51
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the government, formed to protect the riches of the wealthy, is
incompatible with the natural freedom of men; accordingly, he
investigates how to retain the advantages of civil society while
avoiding the evils of subjugation. Rousseau articulates the prob
lem this way:
'How to find a form of association which will defend the
person and goods of each member with the collective force of
all, and under which each individual, while uniting himself
with others, obeys no one but himself, and remains as free as
before.' This is the fundamental problem to which the social
contract holds the solution.ss

Rousseau views the social contract as a way of resolving the
problems of political subjugation and inequality in civil society.
Under Rousseau's construction of the social contract, men give
up their natural rights for civil rights. The natural rights that men
relinquish "are reducible to a single one, namely the total aliena
tion by each associate of himself and all his rights to the whole
community." 56 The civil rights that men acquire by this process
are the total restitution of what they have relinquished. Rous
seau explains:
[S]ince each man gives himself to all, he gives himself to no
one; and since there is no associate over whom he does not
gain the same rights as others gain over him, each man recov
ers the equivalent of everything he loses, and in the bargain he
acquires more power to preserve what he has. 57

Through the process of alienation and restitution, men gain the
force of law to protect what they own. As Maurice Cranston
notes:
[T]he bargain is a good one because what men surrender are
rights of dubious value, unlimited by anything but an individ
ual's own powers, rights which are precarious and without a
moral basis; in return men acquire rights that are limited but
legitimate and invincible. The rights they alienate are based
on might; the rights they acquire are rights based on law.s8

The surrender or alienation of these rights must be voluntary.
As noted above, "To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of
Id. at 60.
Id.
57 Id. at 61.
55

56

58 Maurice Cranston, Introduction to RoussEAU, Soc1AL CONTRACT, supra note
24, at 9, 33.
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will ...." 59 The surrender must also create mutuality between
the citizen and the state. It is the mutuality of obligation and
duty that binds the citizen to the "general wi11" 60 as expressed by
the State. Rousseau states that "[t]he commitments which bind
us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual;
and their nature is such that in fulfilling them a man cannot work
for others without at the same time working for himself." 61 Men
surrender their natural freedoms to the general will, which re
quires the State to legislate equally for all citizens. As Rousseau
explains: "[T]he social pact establishes equality among the citi
zens in that they all pledge themselves under the same conditions
and must all enjoy the same rights .... [T]he sovereign recognizes
only the whole body of the nation and makes no distinction be
tween any of the members who compose it. " 62
Thus, the legitimacy of Rousseau's social contract is based on
the "reciprocal commitment between society and the individ
ual,"63 or, in other words, on mutual consent and reciprocity.
The social contract gives protection to citizens in return for the
fulfillment of obligations by citizens to the society. But like the
first try at civil society (where might made right), Rousseau's civil
society, achieved through voluntary consent, also functions to
maintain and legitimize pre-existing economic inequalities, even
though Rousseau states that "no citizen shall be rich enough to
buy another and none so poor as to be forced to sell himself. " 64
Because "each man recovers the equivalent of what he loses, and
in the bargain he acquires more power to preserve what he
has," 65 the pre-existing inequality endures and is legitimized by
free consent. The poor man gains only the State's protection of
what he has, which is very little or no material wealth.
In his Discourse on Political Economy, Rousseau explains his
view that it is not the responsibility of government to provide
equality in the distribution of wealth:
59 ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 24, at 52.
60 Id. at 69 (regarding definition of general will).
61 Id. at 75.
62 Id. at 76. Although Rousseau's State has "absolute power" over all its citizens,
id. at 74, that power "cannot go beyond the limits of the general covenants," id. at
77.
63 Id. at 62.
64 Id. at 96; see also Rousseau, Inequality, supra note 24, at 146 ("[I)n order to
render everyone what is his, it is necessary that everyone can have something.").
65 ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 24, at 61.
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It is not enough to have citizens and to protect them; it is also
necessary to give some thought to their subsistence. And see
ing to the public needs is an obvious consequence of the gen
eral will, and the third essential duty of government. This duty
is not, as should be apparent, to fill tne granaries of private
individuals and to exempt these people from working, but
rather to maintain abundance so within· their reach that to ac
quire it, labor is always necessary and never useless. 66

Centuries later, John Rawls used this idea as his "Special Con
ception" of justice. 67

3.

Locke: Consolidation of the Existing Social Order

John Locke is also concerned with man's ascent from the state
of nature to civil society. For Locke, the problem with the state
of nature is not the lack of rights and social order, for Locke
believes that there are natural rights in the state of nature which
protect men from subjugation. The character of the state of na
ture is not war, but quite the reverse. The state of nature in
Locke's theory is one over which "Peace, Good Will, Mutual
Assistance, and Preservation" preside. 68 Men in the state of na
ture have the absolute freedom to control their property and
their persons as they see fit within the bounds of the law of na
ture.69 In contrast with Hobbes's vision, in Locke's view men in
the state of nature do not interfere in the affairs of other men. 70
Men also have equality in the state of nature with "no one having
more [power and jurisdiction] than another." 71 Accordingly, the
purpose of civil society is not the creation of a society which pro
tects men's physical and material wealth, as is the purpose in
Hobbes's and Rousseau's visions. Instead, Locke identifies
man's principal problems in the state of nature as the lack of
written law to assist in resolving disputes; the lack of impartial
judges who can interpret the written law; and the lack of a rea
sonable, or cost-effective, means for the execution of legal
66 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy, in RoussEAU, ON
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT; DISCOURSE 01'1 THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY; DISCOURSE
ON POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 24, 163, 179 [hereinafter Rousseau, Political

Economy].
67 See the discussion of JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE (Clarendon Press
1972) (1971), infra text accompanying notes 169-82.
68 LOCKE, supra note 23, at 280.
69 /d. at 269; see also id. at 270-71.
10 See id. at 271.
71 Id. at 269.
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judgments.72
As a result, Locke uses the social contract, or "compact" as he
calls it, as a means to consolidate pre-existing economic and so
cial relations found in the state of nature. Because property and
social relations exist in the state of nature, it is not, according to
Locke, the appropriate function of civil society to create changes
in these institutions. 73 Locke writes:
The great end of Mens entring into Society, being the enjoy
ment of their Properties in Peace and Safety, and the great
instrument and means of that being the Laws established in
that Society; the first and fundamental positive Law of all
Commonwealths, is the establishing of the Legislative Power;
as the first and fundamental natural Law, which is to govern
even the Legislature it self, is the preservation of the Society,
and (as far as will consist with the publick good) of every per
son in it.74

Hence, the sole purpose of the State, in Locke's view, is the pro
tection of existing "natural law."
.
Because men are naturally free, equal, and independent, they
cannot be subject to civil society without each man's individual
consent. Locke writes:
Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal and
independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and sub
jected to the Political Power of another, without his own Con
sent. The only way whereby any one devests himself of his
Natural Liberty, and puts on the bonds of Civil Society is by
agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite into a Community
... in a secure Enjoyment of their Pr~erties, and a greater
Security against any that are not of it. 7

After the creation of the civil society by the consent of all its
members, the majority of the community can determine the lim
its of the State, so long as the parameters of the State do not
conflict with the natural rights of men. 76
Locke's formulation of the social contract is one in which the
state is obligated to protect the natural rights of its citizens but is
not owed anything by the citizen. Unlike the frameworks used
Id. at 350-51.
See Rosenfeld, supra note 24, at 860 (function of Locke's social contract is to
"consolidate a previous existing order, not to create a new one").
74 LoCKE, supra note 23, at 355-56; see id. at 360 (preservation of property is the
end of government and that for which men enter into civil society).
75 Id. at 330-31.
76 Id. at 331.
72

73
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by Hobbes and Rousseau, Locke's social contract is not founded
on mutuality of obligations between the State and the citizen. In
that way, Locke's social contract is not a contract at all. It is but
a mere agreement. 77 As Rosenfeld notes, the social "compact" 78
establishes a trusteeship between the government and its citizens:
the government, as the trustee, holds power and wealth for the
benefit of the people. 79 Hence, Locke rejects the view that the
relationship between the government and the people entails a
reciprocity of obligations. "Instead, duties are delegated to the
government and the people retain the rights." 80 As Locke writes:
[T)he Legislative being only a Fiduciary Power to act for cer
tain ends, there remains still in the People a Supream Power to
remove or alter the Legislative, when they find the Legislative
act contrary to the trust reposed in them. For all Power given
with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that
end....81
Nevertheless, like the other classical social contract theorists,
Locke supports inequality in the distribution of wealth. The
equality that Locke recognizes is a political right. It is the equal
right of all individuals to be free from unwarranted governmental
domination. Locke does not recognize an equality of material
wealth as an integral part of a just society. Locke believes that
because capabilities and talents are not evenly distributed among
individuals, wealth cannot be evenly distributed. Locke writes:
Though I have said ... That all Men by Nature are equal, I
cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of Equality: Age or
Virtue may give Men a just Precedency: Excellency of Parts
and Merit may place others above the Common Level: Birth
may subject some, and Alliance or Benefits others ....82
Locke understood that this inequality of material wealth led to
subordination of the poor and believed that the poor had agreed
to this subjugation. Locke writes that "the Authority of the Rich
Proprietor, and the Subjection of the Needy Beggar began not
from the Possession of the Lord, but the Consent of the poor
Man, who preferr'd being his Subject to starving." 83 Reiterating
77 Locke does not often use the word "contract" in his description of the fonna·
tion of civil society. See, e.g., id. at 332.
78 fd. at 332 (describing the social "compact").
79 Rosenfeld, supra note 24, at 866-67.
80 Id. at 867.
81 LocKE, supra note 23, at 367.
82 fd. at 304.
83/d. at 170·71.
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his belief that subordination is consensual, Locke writes that "it
is plain, that Men have agreed to disproportionate and unequal
Possession of the Earth. " 84
B.

Contemporary Social Contract Theory: John Raw/s's
Liberal Theory of Justice

John Rawls offers a contemporary liberal account of the social
contract. In A Theory of Justice ,85 Rawls attempts to develop
three ideas in order to support his conception of the social con
tract. First, Rawls argues that principles of justice underlie the
moral and political values of the current liberal state. 86 Second,
Rawls attempts to demonstrate that the moral and political val
ues inherent in classic liberalism are the result of a selection pro
cess which all people can agree is fair; this is referred to as the
"justice as fairness" principle. 87 Last, Rawls seeks to establish
that the principles of liberalism support a desirable and func
tional civil society. 88 For Rawls, the subject of justice is not a set
of questions about the arbitrary or even distribution of goods;
rather, justice concerns "the way in which the major social insti
tutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine
the division of advantages from social cooperation. "89 So for
Rawls, the justice of a social institution depends "on how funda
mental rights and duties are assigned and on the economic op
Id. at 302.
RAWLS, supra note 67.
Id. at 3-11. It is no mistake that Rawls's work, published in 1971, came on the
heels of a profound political and social struggle which questioned the very founda
tion and legitimacy of the liberal state. In the United States, the civil rights move
ment, the Black power movement, the antiwar movement, and the second wave of
feminist activity together raised fundamental questions concerning the inequality of
political and social rights. See Norman Daniels, Introduction to READING RAWLS at
xiv-xv (Norman Daniels ed. 1975).
87 RAWLS, supra note 67, at 3-11.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 7. Rawls defines fundamental rights or liberties narrowly. Basic liberties
include "political liberty," including the right to vote and freedom of speech; the
"liberty of conscience and freedom of thought"; freedom of the person, which in
cludes a right to hold personal property; and "freedom from arbitrary arrest and
seizure." Id. at 61. In contrast with Locke's theory of liberty, in Rawls's framework
real property is not part of man's basic liberty, even though it is a major social insti
tution that Rawls believes should be protected. Rawls defines major social institu
tions as "the political constitution and the principal economic and social
arrangements. Thus the legal protection of freedom of thought and liberty of con
science, competitive markets, private property in the means of production, and the
monogamous family are examples of major social institutions." Id. at 7.
84
85
86
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portunities and social conditions in the various sectors of
society." 90 As Professor Thomas Scanlon notes: "Conceived of
in this way, principles of justice are analogous to a specification
of what constitutes a fair gamble. If a gamble is fair then its out
come, whatever it may be, is fair and cannot be complained of." 91

1.

Justice as Fairness

Instead of using the state of nature as a starting point for the
development of the social contract, Rawls uses what he calls the
"original position." 92 In Rawls's formulation of the social con
tract, a group of people, in some ways like us ordinary folk, select
the principles of justice which are to apply to civil society. 93 As
Rawls writes, "They are the principles that free and rational per
sons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an
initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of
their association." 94 But the people choosing the makeup of jus
tice are not like us. They are "objective." 95 Their objectivity is
Id. at 7.
Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1020,
1056 (1973).
92 RAWLS, supra note 67, at 12. Rawls states:
In justice as fairness, the original position of equality corresponds to the
state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract. This original
position is not, of course, thought of as an actual historical state of af
fairs.... It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so
as to lead to a certain conception of justice.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Stephen M. Griffin, Reconstructing Raw/s's Theory of
Justice: Developing a Public Values Philosophy of the Constitution, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 715, 730 n.94. (1987) (regarding the dissimilarities between the original posi
tion and the state of nature).
93 RAWLS, supra note 67, at 11.
94 Id. In his choice of rational actors as the decisionmakers, Rawls relies on the
tenets of rational choice theory. As I have elsewhere explained, rational choice the
ory is not a moral theory; rather, it is a normative theory which tells us what we
should do in order to achieve our goals as well as we possibly can. Rational choice
theory does not tell us what our goals should be. Under this theory, the appropriate
ness of our behavior or our choices can be determined only if our choice is made
without unjustified or unreasonable coercion. See April L. Cherry, A Feminist Un
derstanding of Sex-Selective Abortion: Solely a Matter of Choice?, 10 Wis. WoMEN's
L.J. 161, 175 n.64 (1995). For a discussion of Rawls and rational choice theory, see
Susan Moller Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice, 99 ETHICS 229,
240 (1989) (hereinafter Okin, Reason and Feeling]; SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JusnCE,
GENDER AND THE FAMILY 89-109 (1989).
95 Many liberal scholars have professed their belief in the existence of objectivity
and neutrality. For example, Professor Bruce Ackerman has stated:
In proposing Neutrality, ... I am pointing to a place well within the
cultural interior that can be reached by countless pathways of argument
90

91
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gained by their place behind a "veil of ignorance" which pre
cludes them from knowing their own natural characteristics and
abilities: the people making the choices regarding justice do not
know their race or gender, their physical or intellectual abilities,
or their class status. 96 All they are permitted to know is that they
are heads of families and as such are interested in their families'
share of primary social goods. 97 Rawls believes that the fiction of
the "original position"98 allows him to demonstrate the fairness
of the values chosen though the "objectivity" of those choosing
the principles of justice.99
2.

Distributive Justice

Through what Rawls believes is a fair and objective process,
those in the original position choose two principles that, if fol
lowed, will result in the justice of social and political institutions:
the General and Special Conceptions of justice as fairness. The
former has priority over the latter. The General Conception of
justice distributes all social goods, including liberty, 100 so that any
corning from very different directions. As time passes, some paths are
abandoned while others are worn smooth; yet the exciting work on the
frontier cannot blind us to the hold that the center has upon us.
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, Soc1AL JusTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 12 (1980). At the
same time many feminist scholars have questioned whether objectivity and neutral
ity are possible, and if so, whether they are preferable. As Professor Catharine
MacKinnon has argued: "Indeed, the best way to preserve a concretely unequal
status quo may be by the rigorous application of a neutral standard." CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEx D1s
CRIMINATION 127 (1979); see also Alison M. Jaggar, Sexual Difference and Sexual
Equality' in LIVING WITH CONTRADICTIONS: CONTROVERSIES IN FEMINIST SOCIAL
ETHICS 18, 26 (Alison M. Jaggar ed. 1994) ("[F]erninists should be ready constantly
to challenge norms that may be stated in gender-neutral language but that are estab
lished on the basis of male experience, and so likely to be biased in favor of men.").
96 RAWLS, supra note 67, at 12, 136-42.
97 Id. at 128. Family exists in the original position, and the choosers, who are in
positions of power in the family, are most likely male.
98 Jd. at 140-41.
99 Id. at 120. Ronald Dworkin notes that Rawls's original position is a biased one.
The abstraction of the original position is compatible only with a "deep theory" or
underlying theory of rights. Hence, rights are not necessarily an outcome of the
contract; rather, rights are a presupposition. See Ronald Dworkin, The Original Po
sition, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 500 (1973), reprinted in READING RAWLS, supra note 86,
at 16, 38-46 [hereinafter Dworkin, Original Position]. In addition, Dworkin has pos
ited that the nonneutral values of equal respect and concern underlie the finest lib
eral contractarian theories of the State. See, e.g., RONALD DwoRKIN, A MATTER
OF PRINCIPLE 203-04 (1985).
100 See supra note 89 (Rawls's definition of liberty).
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inequalities benefit those who are the most vulnerable. 101 As
Rawls explains: "All social values-liberty and opportunity, in
come and wealth, and the bases of self-respect-are to be distrib
uted equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these
values is to everyone's advantage." 102 Rawls does not support
equality in the possession of wealth as necessary for a just soci
ety. Rawls is, in fact, rejecting an egalitarianism which justifies
equal distribution in favor of a system of justice which allows
substantial inequalities in the distribution of material wealth so
long as there is no procedural inequality in the distribution of
fundamental political rights. 103 He states that "[w]hile the distri
bution of wealth and income need not be equal, it must be to
everyone's advantage, and at the same time, positions of author
ity and offices of command must be accessible to all." 104 In other
words, "(i]njustice ... is simply inequalities that are not to the
benefit of all. " 105
When the General Conception of justice has been met, the
principles of the Special Conception of justice apply. The Special
Conception of justice consists of two principles. The first princi
ple, which has priority over the second principle, guarantees a
system of equal basic liberties-equal citizenship and equal op
portunity.106 The second principle, also known as the difference
principle, works to allocate wealth, income, and authority. Rawls
explains: "[T]he second holds that social and economic inequali
ties, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just
only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in
particular for the least advantaged members of society." 107
Professor Scanlon has been troubled by Rawls's formulation of
justice, particularly the difference principle. Scanlon observes
that the difference principle appears to limit the benefits received
by those with more natural talent or other lucrative attributes,
requiring that the most talented donate their talents to the most
vulnerable. 108 This formulation leads Thomas Nagel to surmise
101 RAWLS, supra note 67, at 250, 303.
102 Id. at 62.
103 See Tom L. Beauchamp, Distributive

Justice and the Difference Principle, in

JOHN RAWLS' THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION 132, 136 (H. Gene
Blocker and Elizabeth H. Smith eds. 1980).
104 RAWLS, supra note 67, at 61.
105 Id. at 62.
106 Id. at 61.
107 Id. at 14-15; see also id. at 60-61.
108 Scanlon, supra note 91, at 1062-63.
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that the justice or legitimacy of social and political institutions, in
Rawls's theory, "is measured not by their tendency to maximize
the sum or average of certain advantages, but by their tendency
to counteract the natural inequalities deriving from birth, talent,
and circumstances, pooling those resources in the service of the
common good." 109 But as Scanlon notes, according to the differ
ence principle, "a system of social and economic inequalities is
just only if there is no feasible alternative institution under which
the expectations of the worst-off group would be greater." 110 So
in reality the difference principle merely says that
[e]liminating the advantages of those who have more than you
would not enable us to improve the lot of any or all of the
people in your position (or beneath it). Thus it is unavoidable
that a certain number of people will have expectations no
greater than yours, and no unfairness is involved in your being
one of these people. 111

Hence, there is in Rawls's theory of justice a judgment that ine
qualities are in everyone's best interest, since no one would ben
efit from their removal. 112
II
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR
SUBORDINATION: FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF
SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

Social contract theory bases its legitimacy on the consent of
those governed. This is the shining principle upon which the so
cial contract is founded-that the social contract is based on the
voluntary exchange of mutually beneficial promises. This idea of
mutuality is foundational in social contract theory. What this
view of the social contract fails to recognize properly is that the
social contract is also founded on subordination. Inequality
based on wealth, as noted in the previous discussion, as well as
subordination based on gender are both fundamental elements of
109 Thomas Nagel,
110 Scanlon, supra

Rawls on Justice, in READING RAWLS, supra note 86, at 1, 3.
note 91, at 1056; see also Dworkin, Original Position, supra
note 99, at 49 (those in the original position "do not take account of relative depriva
tion, because they justify any inequality when those worse off are better off than
they would be, in absolute terms, without that inequality"). RAWLS, supra note 67,
at 61 (inequality of wealth is acceptable so long as inequality to everyone's
advantage).
111 Scanlon, supra note 91, at 1062.
112See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 67, at 103, 150-51, 179; see also Scanlon, supra
note 91, at 1062 n.68.
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classical and contemporary liberal social contract theory. As
Carole Pateman notes:
In principle, the [mutually beneficial] exchange could take a
variety of forms and any kind of property could be exchanged,
but the contracts that have a prominent place in classic social
contract theory are not only about material goods, but prop
erty in the peculiar sense of property in the person, and they
involve an exchange of obedience for protection.11 3

Again, these theories all embrace a view of the social contract
that encompasses the subordination of women, including state
support of men's right to the sexual access of women's bodies.
Social contract theorists are divided, however, on whether wo
men's subordination is "natural"-that is, whether it exists in the
state of nature or is instead the result of the creation of the social
contract.
Thomas Hobbes: Women Are Free in the State of Nature
but Subjugated by Civil Society

A.

In explaining the origin of women's subjugation, Hobbes does
not believe that women are naturally subjected. Rather, Hobbes
believes that women are free and enjoy equality with men in the
state of nature.11 4
As a result of women's equality in the state of nature, pater
nity, as in the right of a father to his offspring, is also absent. In
the state of nature, mothers, not fathers, have power over chil
dren. Hobbes argues: "[I]n the condition of meer Nature, where
there are no Matrimoniall lawes, it cannot be known who is the
Father, unlesse it be declared by the Mother: and therefore the
right of Dominion over the Child dependeth on her will, and is
consequently hers." 115 As Karen Green notes, in Hobbes's state
of nature "authority over children rests with mothers exclusively,
for without the social structures that ensure paternity, paternity
cannot be proved ...." 116 Thus, part of women's power over
children derives from men's inability to control women's sexual
ity and hence to assure themselves as to the parentage of
children.
Hobbes also perceives women's control over children as based
supra note 22, at 58.
supra note 24, at 254.

113 PATEMAN,

114 HOBBES,
115 Id.
116

Karen Green, Christine de Pisan and Thomas Hobbes, 44

(1994).

PHIL.

Q. 456, 458
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in women's physical care of children. Again Hobbes explains:
"(S]eeing the Infant is first in the power of the Mother, so as she
may either nourish, or expose it, if she nourish it, it oweth its life
to the Mother; and is therefore obliged to obey her, rather than
any other ...." 117 It is not the work of pregnancy and childbirth
that gives women authority over children, but rather the "preser
vation (of children] which entitles the mother to dominion over
her child." 118 Hence, Hobbes argues that the dominion of fa
thers over children and the subordination of women as mothers
are not natural but are rather functions of civil society.
Not only is the institution of paternity nonexistent in the state
of nature, but Hobbes concludes that in the state of nature the
institution of marriage (which subjugates women in civil society)
also does not exist. 119 Therefore, marriage does not naturally en
tail the subjugation of women. As Pateman notes: "Marriage
does not exist because marriage is a long-term arrangement, and
long-term sexual relationships, like other such relationships, are
very difficult to establish and maintain in Hobbes's natural condi
tion."120 Thus, Hobbes believes that any authority or control
that husbands have over their wives is not "natural" but rather is
a result of the social contract. And because the dominion of hus
bands is created by the social contract, the dominion of husbands
vis-a-vis wives is political in nature. 121
In order for women's subordination to be just under social
contract theory, it must be consensual. As a result, Hobbes
posits that women are subordinated in civil society because they
have consented to it. Hobbes maintains that the family is like the
state in that it is created and held together "by a compact that
reflects in miniature the compact that founds civil society." 122
Like men who consent to the creation of civil society for their
own protection, members of a man's household or family consent
to the man's unequivocal control for their protection. With re
gard to children, Hobbes states that a parent has control over a
child not because "he begat him; but from the Childs Consent,
117 HOBBES, supra note 24, at 254.
ll8 Green, supra note 116, at 458.
ll9 HOBBES, supra note 24, at 254 (no matrimonial laws in the state of nature).
120 Carole Pateman, "God Hath Ordained to Man a Helper": Hobbes, Patriarchy
and Conjugal Right' in FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY 53, 60
(Mary Lyndon Shanley and Carole Pateman eds. 1991).
121 Id. at 66-67; Green, supra note 116, at 460.
122 Green, supra note 116, at 460.
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either expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared. " 123
Women, who are free in the state of nature, consent to subordi
nation to husbands in order to be protected from other men in
the state of nature, which is perpetually in a condition of war.
Married women then resemble others who are controlled as a
result of conquest. Hobbes argues that dominion and control of
the vanquished is in the victor. The vanquished agree to give the
use of their bodies for the remainder of their lives to the con
queror .124 No amount of force negates this contract. As Hobbes
states: "Covenants entred into by fear, in the condition of meer
Nature, are obligatory." 125 Thus the marriage contract, which in
cludes the right of paternity and hence sexual access to women
(the conjugal contract/right), is based on force.
Hence, Hobbes believes that women are not naturally sub
jected in the family and in civil society; it is through contract and
through force that women are subjected. Hobbes states: "[T]here
is not always that difference of strength or prudence between the
man and the woman, as that the right [over children] can be de
termined without War. In Common-wealths, this controversie is
decided by the Civill Law: and for the most part ... the sentence
is in favour of the Father . . .." 126 Thus, Hobbes explains the
subordination of women in the state as the result of their subor
dination in the patriarchal family. Hobbes believes that civil so
ciety awards dominion to men because women are already
subjugated within patriarchal families. 127 Hence, under Hob
bes's theory, women's subordination in civil society is based on
their subordination in patriarchal families, a situation which in
cludes women's surrender of their sexuality. Both sites of subor
dination are a result of the creation of the social contract, and
integral to this subordination is the male conjugal or sex-right.
As Pateman writes:
The civil law of matrimony, which upholds conjugal right, is
created through the original pact .... Hobbes makes it quite
clear that conjugal right is not natural. Conjugal right is cre
ated through the original contract and so is a political right.
The right is deliberately created by the men who bring civil
society into being. 128
123 HOBBES,

supra note 24, at 253.

124 Jd. at 255.
125 Jd. at 198.
126 fd. at 253.
127 Green, supra note 116, at 460.
128 Paternan, supra note 120, at 66-67;

see also Green, supra note 116, at 458-60;
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Thus, Hobbes's social contract is a contract that institutes polit
ical right in the form of masculine political power, "a power exer
cised in large part as conjugal right." 129
B.

Rousseau: Women Are Subjugated in Nature

Unlike Hobbes, Rousseau argues that women are naturally
physically and morally weaker than men and hence are subju
gated in nature. Their natural weaknesses make women ill suited
for social and political life. 130 As Pateman notes, Rousseau be
lieves that in social life "[w]omen are 'naturally' made to be at
the mercy of man's judgement and 'to endure even injustice at
his hands."' 131
Rousseau argues that women's abilities and their social func
tion are defined and limited by their reproductive capacity. As
Susan Moller Okin notes, "[A woman's] actual and potential
abilities [are] perceived as stunted, in accordance with what have
been regarded as the requirements of this role. " 132 For example,
in his Discourse on Political Economy, Rousseau relies on wo
men's capacity to bear children to demonstrate that fathers, and
not mothers, should have dominion and control over children.
Rousseau asserts:
First, the authority of the father and mother ought not be
equal; on the contrary, there must be a single government and
when there are differences of opinion there must be one domi
nant voice which decides. Second, however slight we regard
the handicaps that are peculiar to a wife, since they always
occasion a period of inactivity for her, this is a sufficient rea
son for excluding her from this primacy .133

This view of women's functions as severely limited by nature is in
direct contradiction to how Rousseau views the character and
function of men. Men in the latter stages of Rousseau's state of
nature are understood as having infinite potential for intellectual
JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, PuBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT 112 (1993).
129 Pateman,

supra

note

120, at 67.

130 See, e.g., Rousseau, Political Economy, supra note
of political society because subjugated in nature).

66, at 165 (women not part

131 CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM AND
POLITICAL THEORY 22-23 (1989) (quoting JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE; OR,
ON EDUCATION (trans. B. Foxley, 1911)).
132 SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT
133 RoussEAU,

Political Economy, supra

note

66, at 164.

100 (1979).
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and creative activity. 134
Women's capacity to bear children also makes them physically
and emotionally weak. As Lynda Lange notes, "The timidity and
weakness of the woman, according to Rousseau, inspire her to be
pleasing to a man out of the basic impulse of self-preservation,
that is if she is pleasing he is less likely to be violent." 135 But this
timidity and weakness are also described by Rousseau as assets,
because they help the woman to perform her "proper pur
pose"-reproduction of the patriarchal family 136-by encourag
ing the man to stay with her. 137 In Emile, Rousseau writes:
If woman is made to please and to be subjugated, she ought to

make herself agreeable to man instead of arousing him. Her
own violence is in her charms.... From this there arises attack
and defense, the audacity of one sex and the timidity of the
other, and finally the modesty and the shame with which na
ture armed the weak in order to enslave the strong. 138

So the conception of women as unfit for civil life "which appears
as a result of the association of the sexes is not simply the result
of practical cooperation for Rousseau, but a reflection of the es
sential difference between the sexes." 139 Hence, it is no surprise
that Rousseau advocates that women be educated to please men
and to be mothers. Of utmost importance to Rousseau is that
women be trained to be sexually restrained and chaste in order
to assure men of the paternity of their wives' children. 140 Unlike
men, women have no natural self-restraint, so they must be
taught chastity and their behavior must be monitored. 141 Rous
seau states:
Moreover, a husband should oversee his wife's conduct, for it
is important to him to be assured that the children he is forced
134 OKIN, supra note 132, at 100.
135 Lynda Lange, Rousseau and

Modern Feminism, in FEMINIST INTERPRETA
TIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 120, 95, 98.
136 Cf. Rousseau, Political Economy, supra note 66, at 164 ("The chief purpose of
the entire household's labor is to maintain and increase the father's patrimony
.... ").
137 Lange, supra note 135, at 98.
138 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE; OR, ON EDUCATION 358 (Allan Bloom
trans., Basic Books 1979) (1778) [hereinafter EMILE].
139 Lange, supra note 135, at 100.
140 ROUSSEAU, EMILE, supra note 138, at 361.
141 Id. (propriety "prescribes especially to women the most scrupulous attention
to their conduct"); id. at 370 (women never cease to be subjected to men or the
judgments of men and should not be allowed to put themselves above those
judgments).
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to recognize and nurture belong to no one but himself. The
wife, who has nothing like this to fear, does not have the same
right over the husband. 142

Thus, because of the nature of women's sexuality (the ability to
have children), women must be sexually controlled by men to
ensure the existence of the patriarchal family.
Finally, Rousseau argues that women are naturally subjugated
because they lack autonomy and rationality; that this deficiency
results from women's "natural" sexual difference from men; and
that rationality is required to enter into the social contract. 143
Hence, because women lack autonomy and the ability to reason,
they cannot be participants in civil society. 144 As Lange notes:
This abandonment of moral autonomy for women is particu
larly damning from Rousseau, who considers such autonomy
essential not only for citizenship, but even for true humanity.
That the male-headed family requires women to abandon
moral autonomy functions without alteration is a severe criti
cism of that institution. 145

Because women are not party to Rousseau's social contract,
there is no reason to justify further their civil subjugation. Wo
men are not part of civil society because they lack both auton
omy (because of men's natural authority over them) and
rationality (one of the reasons men have natural authority over
them). 146 As Pateman so astutely recognizes, however, women
are not left in the state of nature by any of the social contract
theorists: although brought out of nature (by men's natural au
142 Rousseau, Political Economy, supra note 66, at 164. Rousseau repeated this
argument in Emile, where he writes: "(T]he unfaithful woman ... dissolves the
family and breaks all the bonds of nature. In giving the man children which are not
his, she betrays both." RoussEAU, EMILE, supra note 138, at 361.
143 See RoussEAU, EMILE, supra note 138, at 358 (women lack autonomy: "wo
man is made to please and to be subjugated"); id. at 359 (woman are not rational:
God "abandon(ed] woman to unlimited desires"); see also PATEMAN, supra note 22,
at 1-18.
144 This misogynist tautology motivated Mary Wollstonecraft's challenge to Rous
seau, argued at length and in detail in MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, THE VINDICATION
OF THE RIGHTS OF WoMAN (Carol H. Poston, ed., Norton 2d ed. 1988) (1792). Woll
stonecraft disputed Rousseau's claim that women lacked the capacity for full ration
ality; what women lacked, according to Wollstonecraft, was access to education and
encouragement fully to develop both reason and virtue. Id. at 43, 191-92; see also
VIRGINIA SAPIRO, A VINDICATION OF POLITICAL VIRTUE: THE POLITICAL THEORY
OF MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT (1992).
145 Lange, supra note 135, at 101 (footnote omitted).
146 See ANDREA NYE, FEMINIST THEORY AND THE PHILOSOPHIES OF MAN 8
(1988); PATEMAN, supra note 22, at 96-98.
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thority over them), "[w]omen are incorporated into a sphere that
both is and is not in civil society." 147
C.

Locke: Women's Subjugation Is Both Natural
and Consensual

Unlike the absolutists of the period, Locke views the conjugal
society as consensual. 148 As a result, he rejects the idea that the
marriage is irrevocable or requires the unequivocal dominion of
the husband. Instead, he believes that the marriage contract can
be terminated so long as the goals of the contract-procreation
and the raising and nurturing of children-are accomplished. 149
For example, Locke states that "the ends of Matrimony requiring
no such Power in the Husband, the Condition of Conjugal Soci
ety put it not in him, it being not at all necessary to that State." 150
But because Locke views the role of civil society as consolidating
pre-existing economic and social relationships found in the state
of nature, Locke reinforces the subjugation of women. Women's
PATEMAN, supra note 22, at 11.
Locke states that "Conjugal Society is made by a voluntary Compact between
Man and Woman." LOCKE, supra note 23, at 319.
In describing the nature of men, women, and political authority, Locke is arguing
against the position of the absolutists of his period. Absolutists like Sir Robert
Filmer maintained that paternal authority in husbands and fathers and in the monar
chy were divinely derived. As Chris Nyland explains:
As the absolutists' reading of the relationship between Adam and Eve led
them to believe God had decreed that husbands had the right to expect
obedience from their wives, it followed that the father was the senior par
ent within the family. Thus children owed their primary allegiance to their
fathers. Paternal authority was therefore natural and divine in origin in
that subordination of wife to husband was decreed by God ....
Chris Nyland, John Locke and the Social Position of Women, 25 H1sT. PoL. EcoN.
39, 40 (1993). Obedience of wives meant that conjugal society was a lifelong com
mitment that could not be destroyed by divorce except in the most limited circum
stances. As Molly Shanley has noted, "The notion of justifiable rebellion was as
ludicrous as the notion that a wife might be released from the subjection to her
husband either by their mutual agreement or because of his abuse." Mary Lyndon
Shanley, Marriage Contract and Social Contract in Seventeenth Century English
Political Thought, 32 WESTERN PoL. Q. 79, 81 (1979). Hence, "[t)he marriage con
tract was useful to [absolutists) because it provided an example of a contract which
established a relationship of irrevocable hierarchical authority between the parties."
Id. at 80-81. The marriage contract was used not only as a means to reinforce wo
men's subordination but also as a paradigm for political relationships. Id.
149 LocKE, supra note 23, at 321; see also id. at 319 ("Conjugal Society is made by
a voluntary Compact between Man and Woman: and tho' it consist chiefly in such a
Communion and Right in one anothers Bodies, as is necessary to its chief End, Pro
creation ....").
1so Id. at 322.
147
148
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subjugation may not be necessary for the existence of conjugal
society, but it is nevertheless natural for women to be
subordinate to men. Because women's subordination is natural,
Locke ultimately believes that civil society must reinforce it. 151
As Mary Shanley recognized, it "was part and parcel of Locke's
liberal politics-the family was a private association which pre
ceded civil society and into which the state should not
intrude. " 152
Differing from the absolutists of his generation, Locke does
not argue that women's subordination is divinely derived. In
stead, Locke argues there exists "a foundation in nature" for wo
men's subordinate position. 153 Locke maintains that women's
physical weakness makes them the "weaker sex" and leads to
their natural subjection. For example, Locke, when arguing that
husbands should prevail in disagreements between husbands and
wives, writes: "[T]he last Determination ... naturally falls to the
Man's share, as the abler and the stronger." 154
It is curious that Locke places so much emphasis on women's
physical weakness as evidence of their natural subordination,
since when speaking of men Locke advocates that no one has the
right to force another person to do anything. 155 In fact, he says
that "[t]he natural liberty of man is to be free from any Superior
Power on Earth." 156 So why is the physical strength of men, used
to destroy women's autonomy and subordinate women, honora
ble or just either in nature or civil society? Chris Nyland pro
poses that physical strength is important because Locke views it
as a form of property to be taken into account in any contract,
including the marriage contract. Nyland writes:
151 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
152 Shanley, supra note 148, at 91.
153 LocKE, supra note 23, at 320; see Nyland, supra note 148, at 40, 43; NYE,
supra note 146, at 6; Melissa A. Butler, Early Liberal Roots of Feminism: John
Locke and the Attack on Patriarchy' in FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS AND POLITICAL
THEORY, supra note 120, at 74, 85 (women subjection natural but qualified).
In addition, Chris Nyland notes:
While he accepted that women could match men intellectually, Locke did
not believe the innate capacities of the sexes were equal in all spheres....
[H]e accepted as valid ... the claim that women have less innate muscular
capacity than men.
Nyland, supra note 148, at 46.
154 LoCKE, supra note 23, at 321.
155 /d. at 269.
156 /d. at 283. (With recent discoveries suggesting the existence of life on Mars,
this may take on new meaning.)
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[T]o the extent their greater strength is of value, it should be
taken into consideration in the determination of the provisions
of the marriage contract. Greater strength is a property that
belongs to the man and the benefits of which belong to him. If
wives wish to share the material rewards this capacity enables
them to generate, Locke considered it reasonable that men
ask a price for this concession. 157

The price reasonably extracted is the obedience and subordina
tion and the sexual access of women to men. 158 Locke himself
says that sexual access is critical to conjugal society. The mar
riage contract, he says, "consist[s] chiefly in such a Communion
and Right in one anothers Bodies, as is necessary to its chief End,
Procreation. " 159 Women pay the price of sexual subordination
because it is the cost they must pay for physical protection and
economic security.
Other scholars have argued that what Locke is describing is
not consent at all. As Pateman maintains, women's "apparent
'consent' to the authority of their husbands is only a formal rec
ognition of their 'natural' subordination." 160 Pateman poignantly
frames the question left unasked under consent-based accounts
of marriage, which likewise choose to elide the subordination
content of the marriage contract itself: "Why should a free and
equal female individual enter a contract that always places her in
subjection and subordination to a male individual?" 161 The only
sturdy explanation for this "choice" is that women are not free
and equal before the marriage contract; rather, women's pre
scribed subordinate status is normalized within it. The marital
rape exemption, Pateman further explains, represents a distilled
example of the conflation of consent and submission comprising
the marriage contract, 162 an equation further embodied in the
standards for consent in sexual assault prosecutions generally. 163
So Locke appears to talk about women's subordination as nat
ural and consensual simultaneously. 164 Locke contends that wo
men consent to subordination through the marriage contract. It
Nyland, supra note 148, at 47.
supra note 23, at 322; id. at 319 (purpose of conjugal society is
procreation).
159 /d. at 319.
160 PATEMAN, supra note 131, at 74.
161 /d. at 74.
162 /d. at 76-77; see also PATEMAN, supra note 22, at 154-88.
163 PATEMAN, supra note 131, at 77-83.
164 But see id. at 74 (quoted supra, text accompanying note 160).
157

158 LocKE,
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is of no consequence to Locke, just as it was of no consequence
to Hobbes, that force or physical strength is the basis for wo
men's consent. 165 Violence does not invalidate women's consent
to subordination. Regarding Locke's lack of concern that force
may invalidate any contract, including the marriage contract, Ny
land states:
That one or the other of the bargainers may have a desperate
need for the commodity being offered by the other, the inten
sity of which is not reciprocated by this other, does not for
Locke negate the voluntary nature of any contract that may be
negotiated. 166

Ultimately, I believe that it is Locke's commitment to the exist
ence of a private sphere/gender hierarchy, which precedes the
creation of civil society and into which he believes the state can
not properly enter and regulate, that allows him to overlook the
inconsistencies of his theories as they relate to women. As a re
sult, under Locke's vision of the social contract women are re
quired in the marriage contract to surrender dominion over their
sexuality. Although Locke argues that conjugal society is unlike
civil society, in that it is "perfectly distinct and separate ... built
upon so different Foundations, and given to so different Ends"
than civil society, 167 conjugal society parallels civil society in that
it is a contract based on gender hierarchy, enforceable by the
state. 168 Accordingly, the design of the social contract (as articu
lating the proper concern for both the public and private sphere)
requires women's subjugation, including their sexual submission
to men. As a result, women in Locke's civil society are required
to relinquish control of their sexuality to men.

D.

Rawls: Women Are Not Represented in the
Original Position

Unlike classic social contract theorists, Rawls presents an ac
count of the social contract that is, on its face, gender neutral.
Rawls tells us that those in the original position operate under a
veil of ignorance: ignorance of any of the essential facts about
their talents, their class status, or their gender. Rawls asserts that
165 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
166 Nyland, supra note 148, at 51.
167 LocKE, supra note 23, at 314; see also id. at 319

(political and conjugal society
have "different Ends, Tyes and Bounds"); id. at 323 (family resembles "a little Com
mon-wealth, yet is very far from it, both in its Constitution, Power and End").
168 See ELSHTAIN, supra note 128, at 123.
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gender, like race, is morally arbitrary; thus, gender should be hid
den from those choosing the values of civil society and construct
ing the social contract. 169 The only knowledge that those in the
original position have is "the general facts about human society,"
which includes an understanding of political and economic the
ory, knowledge of human psychology, and knowledge of different
types of social organization.11°
Rawls uses this sexually undifferentiated position to persuade
us that women, as well as men, are represented in the making of
the social contract and that justice as fairness relates to both wo
men and men. 171 But the sexually undifferentiated nature of
those in the original position ultimately reinforces women's sub
ordination in Rawls's account of the social contract. Under
Rawls's formulation, if women are subordinated, then they are
subordinated simply because they consented to it, in the original
position, through reasoned and impartial judgment. 172 This sup
position reinforces women's subordination in Rawls's version of
justice. But in reality, the original position is gendered in at least
two ways: first by designating those in the original position as
heads of families; and second by exempting the patriarchal family
from the application of justice. 173
Although Rawls maintains that those in the original position
are ignorant of their gender, he states that those in the original
position are heads of families, who are often conceptualized as
men. 174 He then goes one step further and refers to heads of
families as fathers. For example, Rawls writes: "The persons in
the original position, however, are prevented from knowing any
more about their descendants than they do about [themselves]
169 John Rawls, Fairness to Goodness, 84 PHIL. REv. 536, 537 (1975); see also
RAWLS, supra note 67, at 149.
110 RAWLS, supra note 67, at 137.
171 See PATEMAN, supra note 22, at 43.
172 /d. at 42 ("Rawls' task is to find a picture of the original position that will
confirm 'our' intuition about existing institutions, including patriarchal relations of
subordination."). Cf. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14
PHIL. & Pus. AFFAIRS 223, 241 (1985) [hereinafter Justice as Fairness]; RAWLS,
supra note 67, at 141-42 ("[T]he preferred conception of justice ... represents a
genuine reconciliation of interests."). In addition, under Rawls's framework, be
cause women are assumed to be represented in the creation of civil society, they
have an obligation or duty to abide by the institutions of civil society. Id. at 14, 116,
344. This supposition also reinforces women's subordination in Rawls's theory of
justice.
173 Cf. RAWLS, supra note 67, at 5-6 (conception of justice is public).
174 See id. at 128, 209.
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. . . . Thus the father can say that he would be irresponsible if he
were not to guarantee the rights of his descendants by adopting
the principle of equal liberty." 175 By treating gender as irrele
vant and making decisionmakers male, 176 Rawls fails to recog
nize the inherent injustice of gender subordination.
Rawls believes that the traditional patriarchal family is just; as
a result, he does not address the subjugation of women within
families. 177 His failure to challenge the traditional patriarchal
family, 178 coupled with his failure to challenge the division of la
bor within families, leaves women outside of his theory of justice.
As Taina Bien-Aime notes:
[Rawls] therefore stops short of entering the private sphere,
which has been instrumental in maintaining the socio-political
superstructure, supporting a patriarchal s~stem of power, and
subjugating over half of the population. 1 9

In fact, Rawls's analysis leaves women and families outside the
administration of justice. Although Rawls contends that social
and political institutions should be just, he unambiguously ex
cludes private association, including the family, from the admin
istration of justice. 180 Even if families were subject to the
principles of justice, the structure of Rawls's theory would keep
the family from being a proper locus for the administration of
principles of justice. Rawls's theory requires that justice be de
175 Id. at 209 (emphasis added); see also id. at 128; PATEMAN, supra note 131, at
46.
Rawls's gendered language is not unimportant. It is not simply gender-neutral.
As Taina Bien-Aime has noted: "Rawls' inadequate consideration of the subjuga
tion of women and his assumption that the 'abstract' person is male creates a gap in
his search for equal justice and equal respect. ... An assumption of gender neutral
ity neglects an historical analysis of men's subjugation of women in both the public
and the private spheres and avoids an analysis of the socio-political separation of the
two genders." Taina Bien-Aime, The Woman Behind the Blindfold: Toward a Femi
nist Reconstruction of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 18 REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1125,
1129 (1990-91) (footnote omitted).
176 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 67, at 19.
177 Id. at 490 (traditional family institutions are just); id. at 462-72 (supporting
traditional roles within families).
178 PATEMAN, supra note 131, at 28.
179 Bien-Aime, supra note 175, at 1128.
180 See RAWLS, supra note 67, at 5-6. In some of his later works, Rawls explicitly
excludes the patriarchal family from the purview of justice. See, e.g., John Rawls,
The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & Pus. AFFAIRS 251, 263
(1988) (political virtues found in the doctrine of justice as fairness must be distin
guished from the virtues that characterize ways of life appropriate to roles in family
life); Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 172, at 241; see also Bien-Aime, supra
note 175, at 1125.
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veloped by people who are mutually disinterested. But by
designating those in the original position as heads of families,
those in the original position are not disinterested in the institu
tion or the rules that govern it. As Susan Moller Okin notes:
A central tenet of [Rawls's] theory, after all, is that justice
characterizes institutions whose members could hypothetically
have agreed to their structure and rules from a position in
which they did not know which place in the structure they
were to occupy. But since those in the original position are all
heads of families, they are not in a position to settle questions
of justice within families. 181

Hence, in Rawls's framework it is not possible to conceive of jus
tice in families because those in the original position cannot be
impartial: they do not have the distance 182 needed to formulate
rules of justice that could apply to families. By conceiving of
those in the original position as part of families (and in hierarchal
positions of power as heads of those families), Rawls leaves the
family and women in a private sphere of injustice.
III
WELFARE REFORM AND THE MALE SEX-RIGHT: THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT REVISITED

We have, in effect married the state. To comply with the condi
tions of our recipient status, we cannot make any personal deci
sions ourselves. We must consult the Welfare Department first,
and the final decision is theirs. The state is a domineering,
chauvinistic spouse.
-Reports from the Front: Welfare Mothers Up in Arms 183

The history of social welfare programs in this country demon
strates that those who receive certain subsistence benefits from
the state have an obligation to conform their behavior to state
sponsored norms. Those receiving welfare benefits must (a) con
form their working lives to acceptable social norms-that is, a
recipient must get a job even if it does not pay enough money
and the person must settle for substandard child care; 184 and (b)
Okin, Reason and Feeling, supra note 94, at 235.
OKIN, supra note 132, at 29.
Diane Dujon et al., Reports from the Front: Welfare Mothers Up in Arms, in
FoR CRYING OuT LouD: WOMEN AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 212-19
(Rochelle Lefkowitz and Ann Withom eds., 1986) (emphasis added).
184 Cf. Diana M. Pearce & Kelly Ellsworth, Welfare and Women's Poverty: Reform
or Reinforcement?, 16 J. LEGIS. 141, 149 (1990) (women require child care program
that recognizes need for universal high-quality child care).
181
182
183

Welfare Reform and the Male Sex-Right

1073

conform their sexuality, or sexual behavior, to the dominant,
state-sanctioned, social norms regarding the proper role and be
havior of women. In the social contract called welfare, women
are forced to surrender control of their sexuality in order to re
ceive basic physical needs. 185 These socio-legal controls on be
havior are applicable only to those who are requesting
subsistence from the state. For example, similar social controls
are not foisted upon others who receive monetary benefits from
the state, such as farmers, corporations, and the elderly who re
ceive Social Security benefits. Those recipients of state aid are
deemed socially worthy of their benefits and, as a result, not sub
ject to behavioral controls.
The surrender of poor women's control of their sexuality in
return for basic physical needs echoes the exchange required of
women in conjugal society by the social contract. Under welfare
programs in the United States, poor women have the option of
surrendering their.sexuality to the proper man-that is, husbands
who can support them-or surrendering their sexuality to the ad
ministration of the state. In this way the state replaces the hus
band in conjugal society and in the subordination of women.
Thus, like the social contracts considered by Hobbes, Rousseau,
Locke, and Rawls, U.S. social welfare programs have facilitated
the establishment of men's political and social right over women,
including the establishment of men's sexual access to women's
bodies, and facilitates the state acting in the traditional role of
husband, when suitable men are not available. 186
A.

Welfare Programs and the Control of Women's Sexuality

By the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the
twentieth century, social reformers and other policymakers be
185 Cf. supra text accompanying notes 158-63 (Lockean social contract theory
forces women to relinquish control of their sexuality in order to have their subsis
tence needs met).
186 Joel Handler has suggested that all welfare reform measures are a result of the
following principles: (1) "social welfare programs reflect ... fundamental attitudes
toward ... the category of poor to be served"; (2) "[t]he core issue is whether the
applicable category is morally excused form work"; (3) "[a]ll social welfare pro
grams are both inclusive and exclusive"; and (4) "[t]he current welfare reform re
flects the deeply held, historical attitude that female-headed households in poverty
are a deviant category of the poor." Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457, 459-60 {1987-88); see also JOEL F. HANDLER,
THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM {1995).
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lieved that children needed the care of the mothers to ensure the
proper development of their social, intellectual, and moral capa
bilities. By this period, social reformers no longer favored plac
ing poor children in orphanages or other institutions when their
parents could no longer care for them. 187 Instead, reformers fa
vored finding ways for poor children to be raised at home. As
the 1909 White House Conference Report on Children
concluded:
Home life is the highest and finest product of civilization. It is
the great molding force of mind and character. Children
should not be deprived of it except for urgent and compelling
reasons.... [C]hildren of reasonably efficient and deserving
mothers who are without the support of a normal breadwin
ner, should as a rule be kept with their parents, such aid being
given as may be necessary to maintain suitable homes for the
rearing of children. 188

In addition to the conviction that children should be raised at
home, reformers believed that women's employment also nega
tively affected their children's social, intellectual, and moral de
v~lopment.189 The 1914 Report of the New York State's
Commission on Relief for Widowed Mothers echoed this belief:
Many thousands of widowed mothers in the State of New
York ... are obliged to deprive [their] children of motherly
attention and training in order to give themselves over to wage
earning work ... [and] are unable to provide their children
with a proper measure of the necessities of life .... They can
not in such cases be successful mothers because they are too
much distracted by wage-earning. . . . The children suffer in
soul and body both. The~ §et neither proper material care nor
proper physical support. 9

As a result of these two convictions about the needs of children
and the proper role of women vis-a-vis children, the early twenti
eth century saw the development of social welfare programs
187 See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL
ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY JN THE UNITED STATES 424-28 (1992); MIMI ABRAMO
VITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLO
NIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 195-98 (1988).
188 ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 193-94 (quoting Proceeding of the Confer
ence on the Care of Dependent Children, Washington, D.C., January 25-26, 1909, at 9
(Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1909)); also quoted in SKOCPOL,
supra note 187, at 425.
189 See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BuT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE
HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 at 40 (1994).
190 ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 191 (quoting New York Relief Commission
for Widowed Mothers, Preliminary Report, March 20, 1914, at 1).
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which gave cash benefits to poor women who had children but
who did not have a male wage earner at home. 191

1.

Mothers' Pensions

The first social programs designed to addr~ss the needs of
some poor women and their children were the mothers' or wid
ows' pension programs. 192 Advocates wanted these programs "to
signify the public value of the labor of mothering and to recog
nize public responsibility for needy mothers." 193 Instead, these
programs, designed and administered by local and state govern
ments, provided limited support to a narrow category of needy
women with children. By 1921, forty of the forty-eight states had
adopted some form of mothers' pension law. 194 By 1935, forty
eight states and the District of Columbia had enacted such legis
lation.195 These programs served only "deserving mothers" who
kept "suitable homes." 196 In the vast majority of states, only
white widowed women were able to meet the "deserving" and
"suitable home" criteria. 197
White widows, however, were not completely insulated from
the stigma attached to single mothers. In order to maintain their
eligibility, women who received pensions were subject to con
stant scrutiny to assure the state agency that they in fact were
deserving of aid. The women receiving mothers' pensions had to
meet certain behavioral requirements to continue their eligibility.
The state, as a condition of aid, gave itself the power to control
the daily family life of recipients, as well as their sexual behavior,
191 Social programs designed to give cash aid to women with children were also
the result of labor market concerns regarding the quality of the future labor force.
For an excellent analysis of this issue, see id. at 190-95.
192 For a comprehensive history of the mother's pension movement, see W1N1
FRED BELL, Am TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 3-19 (1963).
193 GORDON, supra note 189, at 38.
194 ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 194.
195 Mark H. Leff, Consensus for Reform: The Mothers'-Pension Movement in the
Progressive Era, 47 Soc. SERV. REV. 397, 400-01 (1973).
196 ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 200; GORDON, supra note 189, at 45.
197 ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 200-01. African American women were al
most never aided by these programs. For example, 96% of families who were re
ceiving mothers' pension in 1931 were reported as white, and only 3% were reported
as African-American. Id. at 201. In fact, the southern states with the largest con
centration of African Americans were the last to pass mothers' pension legislation.
By 1933, neither Georgia, Alabama, nor South Carolina had instituted a mothers'
pension program. Id. at 194; see also SKOCPOL, supra note 187, at 471-75; Leff,
supra note 195, at 414.
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ensuring that the women who received aid were in line with the
accepted role of women in American patriarchal society. As
Linda Gordon notes, "Widows were not exempt from moral sus
picion and supervision, the responsibility to make sure that
mothers' .aid recipients were 'pure.'" 198 For example, in New
York City, the Board of Child Welfare
required that each pension recipient be visited quarterly by a
Board representative ... (T]he investigator's review of pen
sion appropriateness often turned out to be a loosely con
structed judgement that reflected class and race biases.
Reasons for rejection included use of tobacco, lack of church
attendance, dishonesty, drunkenness, housing a male lodger,
extramarital relations, poor discipline, criminal behavior, child
delinquency, and overt child neglect. Agencies even forced
families to move from neighborhoods with questionable
reputations. 199

Even when the states began to loosen the eligibility rules to in
clude a greater number of women in these programs, administra
tors and case workers continued to allow only women who
conformed their behavior to the patriarchal norm of an unmar
ried mother's behavior, such as celibacy, to receive aid. 200 As a
result, few never-married mothers received aid under the
mothers' pension programs. 201 By focusing on widows, reform
ers avoided the stigmas attached to other unmarried mothers:
widows were women who had followed the rules for women's
198 GORDON, supra note 189, at 49; see also SKOCPOL, supra note 187, at 469
("Women could be penalized ... for inability to prove their marriages, for using a
language other than English in the home, ... [and) for living in improper houses or
neighborhoods ....").
199 ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 202; see also GORDON, supra note 189, at 45
46. Perhaps the social control was so readily accepted by some in society because
some thought of the pensions as paying women to render a service for the state. As
Linda Gordon notes: "Such standards were sometimes defended by analogy to the
requirements made of an employee: The mothers were hired by the state to care for
children, and their continued employment was dependent on satisfactory perform
ance." Id. at 52; see also SKOCPOL, supra note 187, at 465 ("[The mother's) pension
removes the mother and her children from the disgrace of charity relief and places
her in the class of public servants similar to army officers and school teachers")
(quoting Illinois Congress of Mothers, quoted in "State News," CHILD-WELFARE
MAGAZINE, Mar. 1916, at 256-77).
200 ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 201.
201 Id. Although only three states, Michigan, Nebraska, and Tennessee, officially
aided unmarried women, and another eight states had mothers' pension statutes
broad enough to cover unmarried women, a 1931 national survey found that only 55
families headed by unmarried women were receiving aid under a mothers' pension
program. Id.
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behavior by marrying and who were out the support of their hus
bands through no fault of their own. But, as Linda Gordon
notes, this focus on the innocent widow "intensif[ied] the stigma
tization of other single mothers; the emphasis on the widow's in
nocence insinuated the noninnocence of others. " 202
Because of the ideology of motherhood which supported the
existence of mothers' pension programs-based on the need of
children to be raised by women who did not perform waged la
bor-women who received mothers' pensions were prohibited
from performing full-time waged work, even though the combi
nation of full-time work and the mothers' pension could assure
the women of the ability to support their families. Women re
ceiving mothers' pensions could accept part-time work that al
lowed them to stay at home with their children, but acceptable
part-time employment was often the worst-paid work. 203
Hence, by sanctioning the state's control of poor women's so
cial and sexual behavior, and by "arguing that women belonged
in the home and providing them a means for remaining there,
Mothers' Pensions programs replaced male breadwinners and
sanctioned the economic dependence [and sexual subordination]
of women on men or the state."204
2.

The New Deal Program for Women

As a result of the Great Depression, the federal government
created a series of social welfare programs designed in large part
as a safety net for workers in times of crisis and in old age. These
social programs can be divided into "dignified" entitlements,
designed for and available to white male wage earners and their
wives, and "undignified" entitlements, originally available only
to deserving white women and their children. 205 The dignified
entitlements consisted of unemployment insurance and old age
benefits available to certain retired elderly workers and their
wives. 206 These dignified, deserving beneficiaries received a
202 GORDON, supra note 189, at 27; see also id. at 45.
203 SKOCPOL, supra note 187, at 469.
204 ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 203.
205 Dorothy Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black

Citizenship, 105 YALE
L.J. 1563, 1568 (1996)(reviewing GORDON, supra note 189, and JILL QuADAGNO,
THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY
(1994)).
206 See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, tit. II, 49 Stat. 622 (1935) (federal old
age benefits); Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, tit. III, 49 Stat. 626 (1935) (unem
ployment compensation).
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fixed amount of money of which little if any discretion was given
to those administering the program. The undignified aid con
sisted of federal aid programs whose purpose was to meet the
subsistence needs of single mothers and their children. 207 The
level of benefits available was designed to "prevent its recipients
from being too comfortable on their own," and as a result, the
amount of the benefits paid to poor women were too small to
meet the minimal needs of their families. 208 The national pro
gram developed during the New Deal, Aid to Dependent Chil
dren (ADC)-renamed Aid to Families with Dependent
Children in 1962 (AFDC) 209-perpetuated the ideology of the
mothers' pension in that it was available only to "deserving" wo
men and children210 and was based on the ideology that white
women were not expected to work. 211 As was the case with the
mothers' pensions that preceded it, much discretion was given to
201 Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, tit. IV, 49 Stat. 627 (1935) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
208 GORDON, supra note 189, at 7. ADC may have been designed originally as a
means of recognizing the value of mothering and the responsibility of the state to
provide financial support for families with an absent wage laborer, but the level of
benefits has always been too small to raise a family. See, e.g., HousE WAvs AND
MEANS, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: 1994 GREEN
BooK, 366-67 table 10-11 (Comm. Print 1994) (showing that AFDC benefits are
only a fraction of the poverty line in all states).
209 When Congress passed the welfare program in 1935, it was named Aid to De
pendent Children (ADC). The program gave aid only to children; no money was
given toward the support of the mother or other adult caretaker. In 1962 the name
of the program was changed to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
The revised welfare plan provides cash assistance for the child's mother or other
adult caretaker. See Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543 § 104,
76 Stat. 172, 185-86 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602).
210 ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 315.
211 QuADAGNO, supra note 205, at 119; GORDON, supra note 189, at 276 (noting
that Black women were expected to work). Because the individual states had a large
degree of control in determining eligibility, African American women were often
deemed ineligible. As one Southern public assistance field supervisor stated:
The number of Negro cases is few due to the unanimous feeling on the part
of the staff and board that there are more work opportunities for Negro
women and to their intense desire not to interfere with local labor condi
tions. The attitude is that they have always gotten along, and that "all
they'll do is have more children" is definite ... There is hesitancy on the
part of lay boards to advance too rapidly over the thinking of their own
communities, which see no reason why the employable Negro mother
should not continue her usually sketchy seasonal labor or indefinite domes
tic service rather than receive a public assistance grant.
ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 318-19 (quoting Mary S. Larabee, Unmarried
Parenthood Under the Social Security Act, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CON
FERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK 447-49 (1939)).
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administrators and case workers to determine eligibility (status
of deserving) and the amount of the benefit. 212 Similarly, the
ADC statute and resulting regulations required women receiving
benefits to abide by state-sanctioned standards of social and sex
ual behavior. For example, women receiving ADC benefits were
subjected to a "suitable home" test. 213 And as Professor Linda
Gordon notes, the most frequent measurement of this test was
the recipient's sexual behavior: "The presence of a man in the
house, or the birth of an illegitimate child, made the home un
suitable. These provisions also permitted racist policies: For ex
ample, black-white relationships were particularly likely to make
a child's home declared unsuitable." 214

3.

Race and the Reform of AFDC

At least two factors have led to the reforms of the ADC/
AFDC program during the latter half of this century. First, by
1939, amendments to the Social Security Act removed a great
many of the "deserving" white widows from the welfare pro
gram, transferring them to survivors' benefits attached to the old
212 Roberts, supra note 205, at 1570. "Worthy widows" were removed from un
dignified assistance and transferred to the survivors' insurance program of Social
Security, a program that is attached to the deceased man's lifetime wages. Thus,
worthy white widows received a higher benefit without the indignity attached to
welfare. See SKOCPOL, supra note 187, at 536; ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 318;
Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 201-02, 53 Stat.
1360, 1363-64 (1939).
213 Some states also used "employable mother" rules to make African American
women ineligible for ADC. The "employable mother" rule removed able-bodied
women with school-age children from eligibility on the belief that these women
should work. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 318. As historian Jacqueline Jones
notes:
[S]everal southern states authorized caseworkers to deny benefits to any
woman who had a man in her home or who herself appeared "employ
able." Theoretically, this rule rendered all but ill and handicapped black
mothers ineligible for aid, especially during harvest season in rural areas.
Indeed, the "employable mother" provision had originated in Louisiana in
order to deny assistance to families headed by women employable in the
fields.
JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK,
AND THE FAMIL y FROM SLAVER y TO THE PRESENT 263 (1985); see also BELL, supra
note 192, at 93-136.
214 GORDON, supra note 189, at 298; see also ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at
318.
Additionally, "[t]he presence of a man could also make the family fail the means
test. Through the administrative process recently called 'deeming,' caseworkers had
the discretion to 'deem' the income of any adult household members as available for
the support of dependent children." GORDON, supra note 189, at 298.
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age insurance program. 215 Additionally, in the years following
the end of World War II, the number of households headed by
widows fell, and AFDC began to accept "less worthy" women for
benefits. From 1948 to 1953, the number of widowed women re
ceiving welfare benefits decreased by twenty-five percent. 216 At
the same time the number of never-married women receiving
benefits increased by approximately fifty-eight percent, and the
number of deserted, divorced, and separated women receiving
benefits increased by thirty-six percent. 217 Therefore, by the
1960s the majority of women receiving AFDC benefits were
either never married, divorced, or separated.
The second factor which led to the increase of punitive reforms
is that by the mid-twentieth century, AFDC had become increas
ingly identified with Black women and children. The number of
Black women and children receiving AFDC benefits increased in
part because of pressure from an organized welfare rights move
ment consisting primarily of women of color. 218 In the mid
1960s, the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) or
ganized sit-ins and confrontations at local welfare offices. These
women demanded an end to many of the behavioral rules which
were used to control the sexual behavior of women on welfare. 219
One successful tactic of this organization was to flood local wel
fare offices with applications from thousands of new families,
with the intent of overburdening local welfare offices so that they
would relax their eligibility review procedures. The review sys
tem collapsed under the weight of the new applications, resulting
215 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 201-02, 53
Stat. 1364 (1939) (adding benefits for wives and children of primary (male)
beneficiary).
216 ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 321.
217 Id.
218 See QuADAGNO, supra note 205, at 120.
219 See Catherine Fobes, The Politics of Empowerment and Talking Back: Welfare
Rights' Ladies "Sass" at the New York Hilton, Address Before the Annual Women's
Studies Conference, "Gendered Space," Tallahassee, Fla. (Oct. 1994) (on file with
the author); Catherine Fobes, Solidarity Among Women in Social Protest: The Case
of the National Welfare Rights Organization, Address Before the American Socio
logical Association, Miami, Fla. (Aug. 1993) (on file with the author); Catherine
Fobes, Race and Rhetorical Tactics: Referent Imaging and Sassing at the 1969 Wel
fare Rights Protest at the Hilton (unpublished M.A. thesis, Florida State University)
(on file with the author); FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SucCEED, How THEY FAIL 272-74 (1979); see
generally GUIDA WEST, THE NATIONAL WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT: THE SO
CIAL PROTEST OF POOR WOMEN (1981).
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in the approval of all applications.220 As a result, by the mid
1960s African American women and children constituted forty
eight percent of the AFDC caseload. 221 As Professor Dorothy
Roberts has stated, "As AFDC became increasingly associated
with Black mothers already stereotyped as lazy, irresponsible,
and overly fertile, it became increasingly burdened with behavior
modification, work requirements, and reduced effective benefits
levels." 222 As early as 1945 a member of a Louisiana grand jury
charged with investigating the state's welfare program asked a
welfare official: "I should like to know why you have so many
Negro women on your payrolls .... Why can't they go back to
the country and work instead of staying in the city and living on
public welfare?" 223
Punitive reforms of the welfare program occurred at both the
federal and state levels. In 1950 Congress passed one important
federal reform which reinforced the sexual subordination of wo
men. The Notification of Law Enforcement Officers amendment
to the Social Security Act required welfare offices to notify the
police whenever they awarded aid to a child with an absent fa
ther.224 As a condition of eligibility, women requesting financial
assistance had to cooperate with authorities in their search for
absent fathers. 225 This notification rule not only required that
women disclose information about their sexual activity but also
worked to coerce women into continuing some sort of relation
ship with men who may have been dangerous to them or their
children. 226 It also allowed absent fathers to locate women with
220 See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 219, at 274-75.
221 ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 321. Large postwar

period migrations of Af
rican Americans from the southern states to large northern industrial cities may also
have led to increases in the number of Black women and children receiving welfare.
Although Black women were routinely denied benefits by northern states during the
1940s and 1950s, by the use of "man in the house" and "substitute father" rules, the
large African American migrations resulted, in the 1960s, in a large urban Black
population poised to demand services from the state that the Democratic party
could no longer ignore. Teresa L. Amott, Black Women and AFDC: Making Entitle
ment Out of Necessity, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 280, 288 (Linda
Gordon ed., 1990); see also JACQUELINE JONES, THE DISPOSSESSED: AMERICA'S UN
DERCLASSES FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE PRESENT (1992).
222 Roberts, supra note 205, at 1572; see also Mink, supra note 18, at 891-92.
223 BELL, supra note 192, at 63 (quoting a conversation between one juror from
the Coddo Parish (Shreveport) Grand Jury and the local welfare director).
224 ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187 at 322.
225 /d.
226 See Mink, supra note 18, at 894. A 1992 study from the State of Washington
found that 60% of women receiving AFDC benefits had been punched, kicked, or
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whom they had previously had sexual intercourse and as a result
allowed these men greater sexual access to the mothers of their
children.
Punitive reforms directed at restricting women's control of
their sexuality also developed at the state level. 227 During the
1950s many states added "suitable home," "man in the house,"
and "substitute father" provisions which made many Black single
mothers ineligible. 228 In fact, "[b]y 1960, twenty-three states,
many but not all in the South, had some type of suitable home
policy on the books." 229 As the assistant director of Georgia's
state welfare agency stated in 1960: "An ADC home can be held
'unsuitable' for children if the mother is promiscuous, carries on
with a man, or has illegitimate children. " 230
Substitute father provisions permitted the state to determine
that any man in the mother's life was deemed a substitute father.
Because the children would no longer be "deprived of parental
support," the family would lose its eligibility for assistance, re
gardless of whether the relationship was short-term or whether
the man had an income with which to support the woman and
her children. 231 In order to obtain evidence of a man in the wo
otherwise physically abused by a boyfriend or husband. Jody Raphael, Domestic
Violence and Welfare Receipt: Toward a New Feminist Theory of Welfare Depen
dency, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 201, 205 n.26 (1996) [hereinafter Raphael, Domestic
Violence] (citing PEGGY ROPER & GREGORY WEEKS, WASHINGTON STATE INST.
FOR Pus. POLICY, OVER HALF OF THE WOMEN ON PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN WASH
INGTON STATE REPORTED PHYSICAL ABUSE AS ADULTS (1993)); see also Wendy
Pollack, Twice Victimized-Domestic Violence and "Welfare Reform," 30 CLEARING
HOUSE REV. 329, 329-30 (1996) (between 50% and 80% of women receiving AFDC
nationwide are past or current victims of domestic violence); Jody Raphael, Prison

ers of Abuse: Policy Implications of the Relationship Between Domestic Violence and
Welfare Receipt, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 186, 188 (1996); Welfare: The Myth of
Reform, U.S. NEws & WORLD RPT. Jan. 16, 1995, at 30, 36.
227 Other punitive reforms took place in the states. Numerous states decreased
their financial support of the program. Some states increased eligibility rules, in
cluding the more stringent enforcement of residency requirements, which often pre
vented African American migrants from the South from receiving benefits. See
ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 323.
228 Id. at 323; cf. BELL, supra note 192, at 76 (policies fell most heavily on Black
children). Many states also required that women receiving AFDC follow agency
and caseworker guidelines regarding child care and housekeeping. ABRAMOVITZ,
supra note 187, at 323.
229 ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 323 (citing BELL, supra note 192, at 29, 93
110).
230 BELL, supra note 192, at 95 (quoting Gordon Robert, I 000 Children Lose Aid,
ATLANTA J., Mar. 29, 1960).
231 See, e.g., BELL, supra note 192, at 76-79.
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man's life, state agencies conducted surprise "midnight raids" in
order to determine whether there was a man in the house; if a
man was found in the house, he would automatically be deemed
a "substitute father." 232 As Professor Bettylou Valentine has
noted:
State and local administration of the AFDC program was
designed to penalize the welfare mother and her children, not
only by supplying low levels of aid, but by making eligibility a
complicated and negative process, by applying rules of "fit
ness," by prosecuting recipients for adultery, fornication, and ·
neglect when children were born out of wedlock, and by
threatening to take children from their mothers. This process
of intimidation began immediately after passage of the Social
Securitv Act, but state rules proliferated as the AFDC rolls
grew. 2 ~

We have recently seen a reincarnation of the suitable home
requirements in both the Republican and Democratic welfare re
form measures. The 1995 Republican welfare reform bill, the
PRA, provides money to states for the purpose of establishing
orphanages for the children of poor women. 234 The 1994 Demo
cratic bill, the WRA, provides the government with the right to
remove a child from its parent and place the child in an orphan
age or foster home if the parent refuses to find work or get train
ing or if the family is no longer eligible for benefits. 235 In
essence, both proposals allow the state to consider a home un
suitable if the child's parent is unable to care for her due to the
parent's poverty.
The most recent version of social welfare policy in this country,
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia
tion Act of 1996, will further reinvigorate this process. As Pro
fessor Margaret Baldwin astutely recognizes:
Enforcement of these new contracts will likely renew surveil
lance practices reminiscent of the era of "suitable home" in
vestigations. A new enthusiasm for home visitations is
apparent in the intensification of government interest in com
ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 187, at 324.
Bettylou Valentine, Women on Welfare: Public Policy and Institutional Racism,
in CLASS, RACE, AND SEx: THE DYNAMICS OF CONTROL 276, 280 (Amy Swerdlow
& Hanna Lessinger eds., 1983) (footnote omitted); see also Lucy KoMISAR, DowN
AND OuT IN THE USA: A HISTORY OF Soc1AL WELFARE 64-65 (New Viewpoints
1974) (1973).
234 H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 108(a) (1995).
235 H.R. 4605, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess. § 501 (1994); see also Robert Pear, Clinton
Has Tough Plan on Refusal to Work, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1995, at Al.
232
233
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batting allegedly rampant fraud among welfare beneficiaries,
and in the regulatory wedge created by enforcement of new
employment training requirements. 236
States also sought to control the sexual and reproductive behav
ior of poor women on welfare by the use of family cap provi
sions. Family cap provisions fixed a maximum family benefit
regardless of the number of children in the family. 237
Although the Supreme Court has invalidated man in the house
and substitute father rules,238 the Court has upheld the constitu
tional validity of family cap legislation. 239 These policies were
attempts to control women's sexual behavior as a condition of
eligibility and receipt of subsistence benefits. 24 Consequently,
the welfare policies of ADC/AFDC worked to replace men as
the sovereigns of poor women's sexuality. In other words, the
social contract, as evidenced by federal and state welfare policy,
replicated the method and the goals of liberal social contract the
ory. Echoing social contract theory, a significant goal of the
American social welfare policy is the reinforcement of women's
sexual subordination to men. But American welfare policy ad
ded an additional mechanism to the social contract, the sexual
subordination of women to the state when a man is not available.

°

236 Margaret Baldwin, Public Women and the Feminist State, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 120 n.207, on file with the author).
237 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483 (1970) (holding that a state regu
lation setting a maximum grant regardless of family size was constitutional).
238 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320-23 (1968) (holding invalid as inconsistent
with the Social Security Act Alabama's substitute father regulation denying benefits
to children otherwise eligible because their mother cohabited with a man who was
not legally responsible for their support). The "midnight raids" were prohibited by
statute. See also Parrish v. Civil Svc. Comm'n, 425 P.2d 223 (Cal. 1967) (midnight
raids unconstitutional under federal and state constitutions).
239 Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 471; Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (caseworker
searches of clients' homes did not violate Fourth Amendment even though refusal
resulted in the loss of benefits). In upholding the constitutional validity of
mandatory home inspections and eligibility checks, Justice Blackmun, writing for the
Court, asserted with regard to AFDC: "One who dispenses purely private charity
naturally has an interest in and expects to know how his charitable funds are being
utilized and put to work. The public, when it is the provider, rightly expects the
same." Id. at 319; see also Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare:
The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1245 (1965) (one corollary of legal
theory holds that all forms of welfare represent the expenditure of public funds, and
as a result, the public may properly interest itself in these funds even after they have
reached the hands of beneficiaries).
240 But see PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 219, at 127 (man in the house rules
aimed at ensuring that men do not benefit from welfare payments).
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As Johnnie Tillmon, the first chairwoman of the National Wel
fare Rights Organization, sagaciously recognized:
[Welfare is] a supersexist marriage. You trade in a man for the
man. But you can't divorce him if he treats you bad. He can
divorce you, of course, cut you off anytime he wants....
In ordinary marriage, sex is supposed to be for your hus
band. On A.F.D.C., you're not supposed to have any sex at
all. You give up control of your own body. It's a condition of
aid.241

B. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996: The New Social Contract
Like the social contract described by Hobbes, Rousseau,
Locke, and Rawls, the new social contract of the 1990s, in the
form of welfare reform, targets the sexuality of women for con
trol by an individual man, her husband, or the state. The welfare
reforms initiated by the states, in the form of waiver programs, as
well as the dissolution of the AFDC by the federal government
have as their goal the correction of women deemed deviant by
the state because of their poverty, the "illegitimacy" of their chil
dren, and their race. 242 For example, in the early 1990s the coer
cive use of the contraceptive Norplant to limit the fertility of
poor African American women was touted as a legitimate reform
of the AFDC program. 243 Because of the continued desire to
control the sexuality and reproduction of poor single women, the
new social contract primarily encompasses behavior modifica
tions with severe punishments for noncompliance in order to cor
rect poor women's sexual deviance. 244 As Professor Baldwin
241 Johnnie Tiiimon, Welfare ls a Women's Issue, LIBERATION NEWS SERVICE,
Feb. 26, 1972, quoted in AMERICA'S WORKING WOMEN: A DOCUMENTARY HIS
TORY-1600 TO THE PRESENT 355, 356 (Rosalyn Baxandall et al. eds. 1976) (empha
sis omitted).
242 See generally SOLINGER, supra note 10.
243 Norplant "incentives" have been proposed or enacted into legislation in many
states. The legislature of the State of Kansas has gone further, proposing a law of
fering a $500 "bonus" to women on welfare who agree use Norplant. See Tamar
Lewin, A Plan to Pay Welfare Mothers for Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1991, at
9; John Robert Hand, Buying Fertility: The Constitutionality of Welfare Bonuses for
Welfare Mothers Who Submit to Norplant Insertion, 46 V AND. L. REV. 715, 718
(1993).
244 For a comprehensive discussion of behavior modification provisions of AFDC
waiver programs, see generally Williams, supra note 3 ("leamfare," "wedfare," and
family cap provisions are aimed at curbing poor women's socially and sexually devi
ant behavior).
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explains, the welfare reform proposals and programs in the 1990s
enlarge the "supervisory regime" of women "under the aegis of
'child caps,' duration limits, and mandatory parenting and job
training programs, measures which are all strongly inflected with
behavior modification techniques couched in terms of sexual 're
sponsibility' and family competency." 245
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcili
ation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) ends the legal entitlement of poor
families to cash and in-kind assistance. Instead, the PRWORA
substitutes a state block grant program, the Temporary Assist
ance for Needy Families program, in which the federal govern
ment gives a grant to eligible states and allows each state to
design a social welfare program within guidelines set by the fed
eral government. 246 Poor people who meet existing eligibility re
quirements are no longer automatically legally entitled to
assistance. States are given wide discretion to tighten eligibility
requirements, and once a state has used its grant, neither the
state nor the federal government is legally required to provide
the needy family with benefits. 247
Although the PRWORA was supported by Congress and the
President as a "pro-family" measure, the statute's support of
families consists solely of its support of the institution of mar
riage. As Professor Martha Fineman has noted with regard to
other welfare reform measures, both conservative and liberal
commentators consider "marital status [to be] central to the self
help regimes proposed for the poor" and "consider marital status
an appropriate objective to be fostered by public policy."248 In
its prefatory findings Congress states that "[m]arriage is the foun
dation of a successful society" and "that marriage is an essential
institution of a successful society which promotes the interests of
children." 249 In short, Congress assumes that two-parent families
are the source of culture and social order, social stability, eco
nomic self-sufficiency, and core social values. Additionally, the
245 Baldwin, supra note 236, at 102. These measures have also been couched in
terms of cost controls. But given the percentage of the federal budget actually allo
cated to income maintenance programs and the paltry amount of projected savings,
it seems clear that the major goal of these measures is social control and not fiscal
control.
246 PRWORA, supra note 2, §§ 101, 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2110, 2112.
247 See After 60 Years, supra note 3, at 2192.
248 Fineman, supra note 18, at 285.
249 PRWORA, supra note 2, §§ 101(1), 101(2), 110 Stat. 2110.
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statute seeks to support families by destroying families headed
by single women; it does so by eliminating financial support for
these women and by emphasizing the necessity of decreasing the
number of children born to these women.
Tue cost to poor families of this "pro-family" measure is astro
nomical. At least one study has estimated that the new federal
law will add approximately 2.6 million people, including 1.1 mil
lion children, to the ranks of those living in extreme poverty. 250
Tue PRWORA is designed to force the poorest women in this
country into the lowest paying and lowest status jobs.251 It
blames them for the unavailability of employment even in the
lowest paying sectors,252 and it punishes them for their pov
erty.253 Both the PRWORA and state waiver programs assume
that "individual economic default, social incompetence, and sex
ual delinquency of poor mothers ... [are] the ultimate explana
tions for female poverty, and for any resulting 'dependency' on
the welfare system that may result. "254 Ultimately, the
PRWORA uses poor women's behavior as an explanation of
their poverty so that we, as a society, will not have to reform an
economic and social system that creates poverty.
Three of the statute's measures-rules regarding teenage
mothers; rules compelling cooperation of women in support and
250 See After 60 Years, supra note 3, at 2196.
251 As Joanna Weinberg has recognized, many of the jobs created for workfare

programs recipients are "work in shelters, day care centers, medical facilities, and
similar ... services.... [T)hese jobs are traditionally at the low end of the pay scale
and have limited advancement potential. ... Most importantly, they are seen as
'women's work."' Joanna K. Weinberg, The Dilemma of Welfare Reform:
"Workfare" Programs and Poor Women, 26 NEw ENG. L. REv. 415, 446 (1991).
252 Politicians and scholars who subscribe to behaviorist theories of welfare de
pendency often argue that the cause of welfare dependency is nonwork. For exam
ple, Lawrence Mead has written that "[n]onwork ... is the immediate reason for
destitution and dependency among most of today's working-aged poor." LAWRENCE
M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN AMERICA
5 (1992). His theory, like other behaviorist analyses, discounts both the effects of
structural impediments to work and the "work" involved in the nonwaged work of
child-rearing by mothers.
253 Work requirements were first added to AFDC with the Family Support Act of
1988 (FSA). The FSA required all states to establish a Job Opportunities and Basic
Skills Program (JOBS), which was required to include secondary education instruc
tion, job skills training, and job development and placement programs. States were
also required to provide child care if child care was necessary for a recipient's educa
tion, training, or employment. See Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485,
102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). These pro
grams were generally underfunded.
254 Baldwin, supra note 236, at 102.
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paternity enforcement; and rules requiring durational limita
tions-operate to sanction poor women's sexual and reproduc
tive behavior according to the rules of the social contract.
In the PRWORA, Congress expresses a desire to gain control
of-or, at the very least, to influence-the sexual, reproductive,
and social lives of poor teenage girls. The statute does express
concern about the lives of teenage girls, and it does indicate
awareness of sexual abuse by, and pregnancy caused by sexual
intercourse with, adult men. 255 Congress even notes the limited
life opportunities offered to women who become pregnant as
teenagers. 256 Nevertheless, the statute seeks to solve these
problems by mandating educational programs and living condi
tions and by imposing penalties for noncompliance. In order to
maintain eligibility for aid under the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families program, teenage mothers must attend school or
undertake equivalent training257 so that they can become produc
tive workers; they must live in an adult supervised setting258 to
control their sexual behavior; and they must comply with individ
ual responsibility plans developed by state social workers259
which may include, if the state so chooses, abstinence training. 260
While the Act provides no money for college education, which
may open higher paying jobs to poor women, the Act makes
money available for education or motivational programs that
teach "social, psychological, and health gains to be realized by
abstaining from sexual activity." 261 The abstinence programs will
be designed to teach recipients that "abstinence from sexual ac
tivity outside marriage [is] the expected standard for all school
age children"; that abstinence is the only way to avoid out of
wedlock pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases; and that
255 PRWORA, supra note 2, § 101(7), 110 Stat. 2111 (the increase in the number
of pregnancies among the youngest girls is due to the "predatory sexual practices by
men who are significantly older"; at least one-half of children born to teenage
mothers are fathered by adult men; and the majority of teenage girls who get preg
nant by adult men have a history of sexual or physical abuse.by older adult men). In
fact, the rate of pregnancy for girls under 14 years old increased 26% during the late
1980s. Id.§ 101(7}(A}, 110 Stat. 2111.
.
256 Id. § 101(8), 110 Stat. 2111.
257 Id. § 103(a}(l), 110 Stat. 2135-36.
258 Id., 110 Stat. 2136.
259 Id., 110 Stat. 2140-41. These individual responsibility plans are mandated for
any recipient who is at least 18 years old or who has not received a high school
diploma. Id.
260 Id. § 912, 110 Stat. 2353-54.
261 Id.
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the mutually faithful monogamous marriage is the expected stan
dard of human activity. 262 Teenage mothers who refuse to or are
unable to comply with any of these provisions are subject to be
ing expelled from the program. 263 It is clear that PRWORA per
mits states to condition subsistence benefits to these women on
their compliance with th~ state's control of their sexuality.
The PRWORA also seeks to control the sexuality of poor wo
men by compelling recipients to participate in paternity determi
nations as well as child support enforcement efforts as a
condition of receipt of aid. Women who refuse to cooperate with
state authorities in this regard are disciplined by a reduction of at
least twenty-five percent of their families' grant. 264 States may
further punish the recipient for noncompliance by eliminating
her eligibility altogether. 265 This measure creates for poor wo
men many of the same problems created by the Notification of
Law Enforcement Officers Act of 1950.266 Like the Notification
Act, the paternity and child support compliance provisions rein
force patriarchal rights of men to women and children by requir
ing women to disclose to the state detailed information about
their sexual activity. These provisions may even force a woman
to continue a relationship with a man who may be dangerous to
her or her children and in many cases with a man who has no
interest in maintaining a relationship with her children. 267 In ad
dition, the PRWORA contains a provision which links noncus
todial parents' access to their children with their financial
support of their children. 268 This measure reinforces patriarchal/
paternal power over children, whether or not it is in the child's
best interest.
Some of the best-publicized portions of the PRWORA, the
time limits and work requirements, are also designed to punish
poor women for their sexual and reproductive decisions, as well
as to gain control over these decisions and to reinforce women's
dependence on men. In fact, Congress articulated the purpose of
the PRWORA as ending "dependence of needy parents [i.e., wo
Id.
Id. § 103(a){l), 110 Stat. 2141.
Id., 110 Stat. 2135.
Id.
266 See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
267 See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text; see also Raphael, Domestic
Violence, supra note 226.
268 See PRWORA, supra note 2, § 391, 110 Stat. 2258-59.
262

263
264
265
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men] on government benefits by promoting job preparation,
work, and marriage." 269 The statute encourages marriage by
eliminating benefits and forcing women with young children into
low-paying jobs that will not enable them to care for their chil
dren on their own.
The provisions of the PRWORA require that adults receiving
benefits begin working when the state judges them ready to work
or within two years of receiving aid, whichever comes first. 270
The penalty for noncompliance with the work requirement in
cludes a reduction in benefits or, at the state's option, termina
tion of all assistance to the family. 271 Predictably, this provision
does not regard the work that women do in their homes-raising
their children-as work which can fulfill the statute's work re
quirement. Finally, the PRWORA confines the receipt of bene
fits to five years of assistance, whether or not consecutive. 272
The statute does allow some exemptions from the work re
quirement for single parents of young children. For example, the
statute permits, but does not require, states to exempt single par
ents with children under one year old, but the state may grant
this exemption to a recipient only once.273 The statute also al
lows, but does not require, states to exempt single parents of chil
dren under six years old from full-time work: single parents with
children under six years are required to work only twenty hours
per week and may be exempted for the work requirement alto
gether if the parent can demonstrate that child care is
unavailable. 274
Id. § 103(a)(l), 110 Stat. 2113.
Id.
271 Id.
272 Id., 110 Stat. 2137. The statute permits exemptions from this limitation if the
recipient received benefits as a minor child; the time spent receiving relief as a minor
child is not counted toward this limitation so long as the minor child was not the
head of household. Id. The statute also contains a hardship exception, which re
laxes these time limitations for victims of domestic violence. Id., 110 Stat. 2137-38.
In addition, the state may exempt up to 20% of its caseload from the lifetime cap
provision. Id., 110 Stat. 2138.
273 Id., 110 Stat. 2131.
274 See id., 110 Stat. 2132, 2133. Joanna Weinberg notes that exempting women
with young children from work requirements ultimately puts these women at a
greater disadvantage in the labor market and may ultimately put these women at
risk for becoming long-term welfare recipients. Weinberg, supra note 251, at 447
(one study "suggests that delaying a woman's return (or entry) to the labor market
until the youngest child turns six, places women at a disadvantage because of her
age, lack of recent work experience, and the length of time on public assistance").
269
210
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Finally, despite all of the rhetoric regarding "welfare queens,"
the PRWORA does not contain a child exclusion provision,
which would deny benefits to children conceived and born to wo
men while receiving welfare benefits.275 Child exclusion provi
sions have long been defended as essential to the deterrence of
births by single women276 and as indispensable both to persuad
ing poor women with children to work and to putting recipients
275 Child exclusion provisions differ significantly from the family cap provisions,
which the Supreme Court declared· constitutional. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970). As Martha Davis has astutely noted:
These programs operate differently in ways that are critical. ... For exam
ple, under a family maximum, when the oldest child in a large family be
comes too old to receive AFDC, the family continues to receive the same
level of benefits because the younger child's grants have not been totally
rescinded. Under child exclusion, however, when the oldest child becomes
too old to receive AFDC, those benefits disappear; the excluded children
never receive benefits because their eligibility has been completely
eliminated.
Martha F. Davis, Challenging Child Exclusion Programs, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
20, 26 (1996).
276 This defense is based on the uninformed and often racist belief that women on
welfare have additional children in order to collect increased benefits and that refus
ing women the small increase will discourage maternity and ultimately foster work
among poor women with children. As has been recognized:
African American and Latino welfare recipients are often characterized as
sexually irresponsible, inclined to bear children outside of marriage, and
encouraged by AFDC benefits to bear numerous children. These stere
otypical traits are linked to the offensive idea of a moral deficiency among
African American and Latino welfare recipients which causes them to re
ject marriage, legitimate births and limited family size. It is this racial ster
eotype of a lack of "family values" that is rarely applied to poor whites and
which is often blamed for the poverty of Latino and African American
communities.
Martha F. Davis, The New Paternalism: War on Poverty or War on Women?, 1 GEO.
J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 88, 90 (1993) (quoting Letter from the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, and
the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund to Louis Sullivan, Secretary of
Health and Human Services, June 26, 1992, at 11-12, regarding the New Jersey child
exclusion program).
These charges are made in the face of a Health and Human Services commis
sioned study that found no correlation between the level of welfare benefits and
pregnancy. This study also found that the average increase in AFDC benefits result
ing from the birth of an additional child is less than a mere $64 a month. See Les
Payne, At $64 That Baby's A Steal, NEWSDAY, Jan. 26, 1992, at 30; Davis, supra at 89
n.20 (in New Jersey the increase is $64 per month for the second child receiving
benefits; in Arkansas, the increase is only $42 per month). Even so, many states are
currently considering or implementing child exclusion programs through federal
waivers. See Laura M. Friedman, Family Cap and the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine: Scrutinizing a Welfare Woman's Right to Bear Children, 56 OHIO ST. L.J.
637, 638 nn.8-10, 639 n.11. (1995); Yvette Marie Barksdale, And the Poor Have Chil
dren: A Harm-Based Analysis of Family Caps and the Hollow Procreative Rights of
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"on the same footing as working people who do not get a raise
when they have an additional child. " 277 This reasoning does not
take into account the fact that working families do indeed get a
raise when they have an additional child; the raise is in the form
of a decreased tax burden. In addition, this reasoning does not
consider the fact that the per capita income of families on welfare
actually decreases with the birth of each additional child because
the increases received by the family are microscopic. 278 Never
theless, many conservative and some liberal theorists, like
Charles Murray and Stephen Sugarman, continue to argue that
the promise of public assistance encourages poor women to bear
children. 279
As Professor Lucy Williams notes, child exclusion provisions
are "inherently flawed" because they are founded on the belief
that women receiving welfare benefits operate under a value sys
tem that is drastically different from the value system used by
those not receiving public assistance benefits. 280 This is in fact
untrue. Even though women receiving assistance often do not
have access to family planning and abortion services,281 women
receiving welfare benefits have an average of only 1.9 children. 282
This number is almost identical to the average number of chil
dren in two-parent families, which is 1.88.283 Despite these facts,
child exclusion programs remain popular at the state level as a
Welfare Beneficiaries, 14 LAW AND INEQUALITY 1, 10-15 (1995); see also Davis,
supra note 275, at 20.
277 Davis, supra note 275, at 20.
278 THERESA FUNICIELLO, TYRANNY OF KINDNESS: DISMANTLING THE WELFARE
SYSTEM TO END POVERTY IN AMERICA 57 (1993).
279 See MURRAY, supra note 19, at 154-66 (arguing that the program induces
births by women who otherwise would have had fewer children or had them under
different circumstances); Stephen D. Sugarman, Financial Support of Children and
the End of Welfare as We Know It, 81 VA. L. REV. 2523, 2534 (1995).
280 Williams, supra note 3, at 736.
281 In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980), the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, which disallows the federal government
from funding the abortions of poor women through Medicaid. See also Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977). In both Harris and Maher, the Court held that the
Constitution does not require the government to finance abortion at all. Harris, 448
U.S. at 326; Maher, 432 U.S. at 469.
282 MARIAN WRIGHT EDELMAN, FAMILIES IN PERIL: AN AGENDA FOR SOCIAL
CHANGE 70-71 (1987) (average number of children in families receiving AFDC ben
efits is 1.9); see also Joel F. Handler, Two Years and You're Out, 26 CONN. L. REv.
857, 861 (1994) ("Most welfare recipients do not have a large number of children.").
283 See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, "Household and
Family Characteristics: March 1994," in CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: POPULA
TION CHARACTERISTICS (1995).
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way for states to control the behavior of poor women by condi
tioning assistance on the reproductive decisions of welfare
recipients. 284
CONCLUSION

Under liberal social contract theory, women are required to
relinquish control of their sexuality to husbands in return for sub
sistence and safety. Under the new social contract, the
PRWORA, poor women without husbands are required to sur
render control of their sexuality to the state in order to receive
basic physical needs. This surrender of poor women's control of
their sexuality in return for basic physical needs echoes the ex
change required of women in conjugal society by the social con
tract. Under American welfare programs, poor women have the
option of surrendering their sexuality to proper men-that is,
husbands who can support them-or of surrendering their sexu
ality to the administration of the state. In this way the state re
places the husband in conjugal society and in the subordination
of women.
The PRWORA ends the legal entitlement for cash and in-kind
assistance to poor families. Even if poor women meet all of the
behavioral and work requirements of the Act, they may never
theless be denied assistance if the state has already committed
the balance of the federal grant. 285 In the end, the women con
tract with the state for subsistence. They may fulfill their portion
of the contract with the state by not having sex, by finding jobs,
by finding child care (whether or not they think it is safe or suita
ble), and by attending abstinence training classes, but still not
receive any cash assistance from the state. The state is under no
legal obligation to perform its part. Like the position of women
in the traditional marriage contract with regard to their hus
bands, "the legal interests held by women vis a vis the state are
contracts of adhesion, the terms of which poor women had no
284 As Martha Davis points out, under the child exclusion provision, the "benefits
are no longer based on family size but on the timing of children's conception and
birth." This provision is clearly aimed at controlling poor women's sexual and re
productive activity. Davis, supra note 275, at 20. Some have argued that child ex
clusion laws are an unconstitutional violation of the fundamental right of poor
women to bear children without undue state interference. See Barksdale, supra
note 276, at 16-20.
285 PRWORA, supra note 2, § 103(a)(l), 110 Stat. 2113.
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part in negotiating and have little power to change. " 286 The pro
visions of the PRWORA reflect a judgment that poor women are
unable to make "responsible" decisions regarding their social,
sexual, and reproductive lives. This irresponsibility makes them
ill suited for personal sovereignty and motherhood. The
PRWORA makes it clear that the new social contract asserts that
poor women are undeserving of motherhood, of subsistence pro
vided for by the state, and perhaps of citizenship. 287 These wo
men are deemed better suited for low-paying, low-status work.
Hence, women living under the new social contract of
PRWORA find themselves in much the same position as their
long dead sisters, living in an economy that devalues their child
rearing work and trading their independence and sexual sover
eignty to "a man" or "the man" for subsistence for themselves
and their children. Women living under the new social contract
know, indeed, that everything old is new again.

286 Baldwin, supra note 236, at 120.
287 See Roberts, supra note 205; Ann

Shola Orloff, Gender and the Social Rights
of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States, 58
AM. Soc. REv. 303, 307 (1993) (full social citizenship includes control over sexuality
and reproduction); Jurgen Haberrnas, Multiculturalism and the Liberal State, 47
STAN. L. REv. 849, 851 (1995) (citizens can make use of public autonomy only if
private autonomy is protected).
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